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THE SALIENCE THEORY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Natasha Sarin* 
August 2018 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, banks’ fee income was their fastest-growing source of revenue. This 
revenue was often generated through nefarious bank practices (e.g., ordering overdraft transactions 
for maximal fees). The crisis focused popular attention on the extent to which current regulatory 
tools failed consumers in these markets, and policymakers responded: A new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau was tasked with monitoring consumer finance products, and some of the earliest 
post-crisis financial reforms sought to lower consumer costs.   
 
This Article is the first to empirically evaluate the success of the consumer finance reform agenda 
by considering three recent price regulations: a decrease in merchant interchange costs, a cap on 
credit card penalty fees and interest-rate hikes, and a change to the policy default rule that limited 
banks’ overdraft revenue. The varied efficacies of these interventions suggest several insights for 
policymakers. First, price regulation of non-salient prices (such as late fees or overdraft charges) 
is desirable. This is true even in a perfectly competitive world, because the existence of shrouded 
prices can lead to excessive demand for consumer financial products; cause consumers to expend 
tremendous energy to avoid hidden fees; and result in cross-subsidy of sophisticated consumers, 
who incorporate these prices into their decision-making, by unsophisticated customers, who do 
not. In an imperfectly competitive world, regulations that target non-salient prices can also 
decrease overall consumer costs. A substitute for price regulation is the use of behavioral tools, 
such as shocks to consumer attention, to encourage consumers to take non-salient prices into 
account. Such simple, timely disclosure is a choice-preserving alternative to banning expensive 
consumer finance products.  
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Gillis, Claudia Goldin, Jeffrey Gordon, Andrew Hayashi, Jim Hines, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, David 
Hoffman, Richard Hynes, Lawrence Katz,  Aaron Klein,  Adam Levitin, Nellie Liang, Joshua Mitts, Vladimir 
Mukharlyamov, Eva Nagypal, Scott Nelson, Gabriel Rauterberg, Morgan Ricks, David Scharfstein, Dorothy Shapiro-
Lund, Steven Shavell, Louise Sheiner, Jeremy Stein, Guhan Subramaniam, Eric Talley, Aileen Thomas, and Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan.  I am indebted to Adabelle Ekechukwu for outstanding research assistance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
In the decades leading up to the Great Recession (“Recession” or “crisis”), consumer 
finance increasingly became a “do-it-yourself” industry, with individuals forced to take 
responsibility for a greater set of important, and increasingly complex, financial decisions.1 Given 
the asymmetry of sophistication between consumers and large financial institutions, the result was 
a market in which unwitting consumers often bore high and avoidable costs. Regulators responded: 
A new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was tasked with monitoring these markets, and 
some of the earliest post-crisis financial reforms were aimed at reining in consumer costs.  
This Article studies three of these reforms—restrictions on late fees and interest rate hikes 
in the CARD Act, caps on debit interchange from the Durbin Amendment, and changes to the 
overdraft default rules—and draws lessons from their varied efficacies. These interventions all 
sought to curb banks’ fee revenue. And yet a careful empirical study illustrates that while banks 
offset Durbin interchange losses by raising other fees, the same is not true for the CARD Act, and 
is true to a much lesser extent for the overdraft opt-in rules. This Article considers why similarly 
situated regulatory interventions had such different impacts on consumers, seeking to draw lessons 
for future policy. 
One answer it offers is salience. Consider a simple example: Penalty fees are ignored by 
unsophisticated consumers. Banks then charge above-cost fees, either keeping this revenue as 
profit (in an imperfectly competitive market) or using it to offer a below-cost salient price, for 
example a no-interest line of credit to a new customer. Regulatory interventions that curb banks’ 
ability to exploit some consumers’ ignorance of non-salient prices will decrease inefficiencies as 
well as cross-subsidies by unsophisticated consumers, who bear non-salient costs, of their more 
sophisticated counterparts, who do not. In imperfectly competitive markets, price regulation can 
also increase overall consumer welfare.   
This Article’s contribution is three-fold. First, it applies the shrouded pricing framework 
to consumer finance markets, shedding light both on how the regulation of non-salient prices is 
effective (e.g., the CARD Act) and how price regulation in the absence of a salience problem may 
fail to meet is objectives (e.g., the Durbin Amendment). Second, it offers a novel alternative to 
price regulation: intervening to make prices salient to consumers—a “salience shock.” The recent 
experience of the UK Financial Conduct Authority, where text alerts indicating low account 
balances substantially decrease the likelihood of costly overdrafts, illustrates the promise of such 
an approach. Finally, this Article responds to recent debates in the legal literature surrounding 
mandated disclosure (offered notably by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider) and the 
limits of behavioral law and economics (offered forcefully by Professors Lauren Willis, Ryan 
Bubb, and Richard Pildes). This Article offers a path forward for disclosure as it advocates for 
simple, timely disclosures that consumers can retain long enough to act upon. It also argues against 
the necessity of paternalistic bans of expensive consumer products, since choice-preserving 
approaches like salience shocks are both theoretically and empirically viable.   
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents evidence from case studies of three recent 
price regulations involving debit interchange fees, credit card contract terms, and overdraft fees. 
First, I consider the Durbin Amendment (hereinafter referred to as “Durbin”), which restricts debit 
swipe fees, reducing bank interchange revenue by nearly 40%. Impacted banks responded to 
Durbin by increasing fees on all customer accounts. They also encouraged greater use of credit, 
                                                 
1 Andrea Ryan et al., A Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461 (2011). 
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because credit interchange fees are not capped by Durbin. Moreover, the decrease in debit 
interchange fees—a large cost of doing business for merchants—was intended to be passed down 
to consumers through lower prices. However, Durbin failed to result in any meaningful consumer 
savings, and some merchants even raised prices. Durbin had an especially deleterious impact on 
low-income consumers who found themselves priced out of the traditional financial system 
because of higher account fees.  
 Second, I examine the CARD Act, which limited the ability of card companies to change 
interest rates and charge penalty fees without appropriate disclosure. Academics who have studied 
the CARD Act2 find that, unlike the response to Durbin, affected financial institutions did not 
offset the CARD Act’s impact by raising other fees or restricting consumer access to credit in 
unintended ways.3 Overall, the distortionary consequences of the CARD Act appear to be much 
more limited than those of Durbin.   
 Third, I consider restrictions on bank overdraft practices. Under new rules, banks are not 
allowed to impose overdraft fees for ATM or point-of-sale overdraft without opting customers in 
to their overdraft protection. Legal scholars who study overdraft conclude that, because banks are 
eager to game the rules by putting pressure on customers to opt in, the new regime is a nudge gone 
awry4 that demonstrates the limitations of behaviorally informed policymaking.5 I argue that this 
interpretation is overly pessimistic. First, opt-in rates for existing accounts (16%) and new 
accounts (22%) are substantially below the pre-regulation opt-in rate (100% for most banks). 
Second, many large financial institutions (such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co., and 
Wells Fargo) went beyond the new requirements, moving away from overdraft entirely because of 
reputational consequences and litigation risk associated with it.  
Part II of this Article provides a simple conceptual framework to establish that the existence 
of non-salient prices justifies regulatory intervention and that, in the presence of market 
imperfections, this intervention can lower overall consumer costs. It demonstrates that while price 
regulation in the absence of a salience problem may be desirable, it is more likely to be offset by 
profit-maximizing firms.   
Part III then applies this conceptual framework to the case studies described above to argue 
for several principles to guide consumer financial regulation. First, shrouded pricing is common 
in consumer finance—for example, penalty fees are not salient to consumers when they decide on 
credit instruments and overdraft fees are not salient, even to consumers who bear them 
frequently—suggesting the potential for effective price regulation in these markets. Importantly, 
the desirability of regulatory intervention does not hinge on monopoly market power: Even without 
supracompetitive profits, regulating non-salient prices will reduce both cross-subsidies and 
inefficient consumer searches for banking alternatives. In the presence of market power, price 
regulation decreases overall consumer costs. Understanding market dynamics can shed light on 
other useful policy interventions. For example, market power that results from customer stickiness 
                                                 
2 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. 
ECON. 111 (2014); Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 967 (2012).   
3 Chris Dodd, The Moment for Credit Card Reform, HUFFPOST (May 25, 2011), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-dodd/the-moment-for-credit-car_b_181296.html (last visited on June 11, 
2018). The CARD Act did reduce access to credit for students under 21 years of age, but this was an intended 
consequence.  
4 Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (2013). 
5 Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 
(2013). 
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can be diminished by decreasing switching costs. Additionally, cost shocks to merchants, like 
interchange savings from the Durbin Amendment, may not be fully passed through to consumers. 
As such, if decreasing consumer costs is the objective, regulations resulting in direct consumer 
savings are most likely to be effective. Finally, behavioral tools, particularly nudges toward 
desirable behavior, play an important role in consumer financial regulation, as demonstrated by 
the new overdraft opt-in regime. To the extent nudges can be designed to make non-salient bank 
fees and practices salient to consumers, they can achieve the same ends as regulating shrouded 
prices directly and are superior to mandates (like banning overdraft protection) because they 
preserve a role for consumer choice. 
Part IV considers limitations to the salience theory and examines aspects of the case 
studies—for example, the differential bank response to changes to the overdraft opt-in regime—it 
struggles to explain. Part V then concludes.  
I.  CASE STUDIES 
 
 In the wake of the Recession, the financial sector underwent significant regulatory changes, 
many of which were targeted at regulating consumer financial products. Three of these changes—
implemented through Durbin, the CARD Act, and Regulation E—focused on the regulation of 
debit and credit cards. They sought to reduce the financial burden consumers face due to merchant 
interchange fees, credit card contract terms, and overdraft fees. Each regulation is discussed to 
elucidate the successes and failures of regulating non-salient and salient prices.    
 
A.  The Durbin Amendment 
 
1.  The Policy Problem. The payment card system is a two-sided market, with cards 
demanded both by cardholders who use them as a means of purchase and merchants who accept 
them as payment for goods.6 To simplify a complex series of transactions,7 the interchange fee can 
be viewed as the processing fee that a customer’s bank collects from a merchant following a card 
transaction.8 
The legality of interchange has been challenged repeatedly in court, the earliest example 
being National Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa USA, Inc.,9 which was followed by a near-
constant stream of antitrust cases10 alleging price fixing by Visa and Mastercard, who together 
                                                 
6 Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange 
Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 626 (2006). 
7 Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan. Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Markets: What Role for Public 
Authorities? A Summary of a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Conference, KANSAS CITY FED. RES. (2006), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/OfOWO/publicat/econrev/PDF/1q06pach.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (providing 
extensive detail on the mechanics of interchange).  
8 Id. In general, this processing fee varies depending on the card used: “[C]redit cards carry the highest interchange 
fee, PIN debit the lowest, with signature debit in between.”   
9 596 F. SUPP. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding interchange fee arrangements 
more procompetitive than anticompetitive). 
10 See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’g, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450 (N.D. 
Cal. Jul. 25, 2005); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005), aff’g, 297 F. Supp. 2d 
503 (E.D.N.Y., 2003); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’g, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 811 (2004); see also Avivah Litan, Retailers Sue Visa, Seek Lower Credit 
Card Interchange Fees, GARTNER RESEARCH (2005). For a full description of legal challenges to interchange, see 
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control nearly 70% of the payment card market and set interchange rates directly.11 These fees are 
increasing in significance for merchants—now often the second-highest cost of operating after 
labor12—both because of the growth in electronic payments and because of the introduction of 
high-interchange rewards cards. Exploding interchange fees prompted calls for regulatory 
intervention.13  
2.  Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act14 
was introduced by Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill) and is colloquially known as the “Durbin 
Amendment.” In its final form, it required that the Federal Reserve Board (“Federal Reserve” or 
“Board”) establish rules ensuring “reasonable and proportional” debit interchange fees that would 
decrease merchant costs and result in lower consumer prices.15 The amendment preserved an 
exception for small issuers (with less than $10 billion in assets).16 Because of its late introduction 
to Dodd-Frank in May 2010, Durbin was passed without hearings or debate, and many took issue 
with the speed of its passage.17 Critics also pointed to the difficulties of prior interchange caps; for 
example those implemented in Australia, which resulted in bank fee increases to recover lost 
revenue.18  
                                                 
Rising Interchange Fees Have Increased Costs for Merchants, but Options for Reducing Fees Pose Challenge, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2009). 
11 See Travis B. Plunkett, Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing: Proposed Rule (2011), 12 CFR Part 235, 
Docket No. R-1404, https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/debit-cards-FRB-interchange-rule-comments-2-22-11.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
12 Paul Gackle, The Fight Over Interchange Fees, FRONTLINE (2009), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/themes/interchange.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
13 Pacheco & Sullivan, supra note 7. 
14 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1075, 124 Stat. 
1376, 2068-74 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2 (2012)). 
15Id. § 1693o-2(b)(2). For this work, I focus on Durbin’s interchange cap. Further work remains to be done on the 
consequences of other aspects of Durbin, for example the exclusivity and routing restrictions, which halved volume 
for Visa’s pin-debit payment processer, Interlink, causing it to levy a network fee to encourage routing through 
Interlink. See Interlink Loses More Than Half Its Volume as Durbin Routing Provisions Take Effect, DIGITAL 
TRANSACTIONS (Jul. 25, 2012), https://www.digitaltransactions.net/interlink-loses-more-than-half-its-volume-as-
durbin-routing-provisions-take-effect/; Ursula Librizzi, Visa Increasing Fixed Acquirer Network Fee (FANF) Rates, 
PAYJUNCTION BLOG (Dec. 21, 2017), https://blog.payjunction.com/visa-fixed-acquirer-network-fee/. 
16 Id. § 1693o-2(a)(6) 
17 The President of the American Bankers Association called this “11th hour” legislation that “handed one industry 
a victory without considering the unintended consequences of the government second-guessing the market.” Rob 
Nichols, The Durbin Amendment: A Costly Price Control Experiment, THE HILL (June 27, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/284842-the-durbin-amendment-a-costly-price-control-
experiment. Some even attacked Durbin for his championing of interchange legislation, noting that some of the largest 
beneficiaries (Wal-Mart and Home Depot) lobbied him intensely. Wal-Mart even opened stores in the Chicago area 
(which Durbin represents) and donated $20 million to Illinois charities on the eve of a key vote on the measure. See 
Jonathan Strong, Dick Durbin’s Cozy Alliance with Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and the Giant Retail Lobby (Mar. 29, 
2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/03/29/dick-durbins-cozy-alliance-with-wal-mart-home-depot-and-the-giant-retail-
lobby/ (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018).  
18 See, e.g., Howard Chang et al., The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of 
Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia, 4 Rev. Network Econ. 328 (2005) (noting that the five major banks in Australia 
increased credit card fees by 50 percent in response to credit card interchange regulation and that the intervention 
benefitted merchants with the costs shared by banks and consumers). Note though that this assessment of the 
Australian experience is not shared by all observers. Cf. Joseph Farrell, Assessing Australian Interchange Regulation: 
Comments on Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 400 (2005).(arguing that Chang (2005) 
suffer from limited and noisy data, and that the “correct reading” is “so far, the data doesn’t show much.”).  
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In December 2010, the Federal Reserve proposed a rule implementing Durbin: a $0.12 cap 
per debit transaction.19 The financial services industry was outraged: In fact, a midsize bank, TCF, 
challenged the constitutionality of Durbin, arguing that the regulation forced banks to offer debit 
services at a price below cost.20 Regulators voiced concern as well, suggesting that the small-issuer 
exemption would fail in practice because networks would decrease interchange rates for large and 
small issuers alike, rather than vary rates by issuer size.21  
The Federal Reserve’s final rule raised the interchange fee cap to $0.21 plus five basis 
points times the total value of the transaction. This final rule prompted yet another constitutional 
challenge, this time by a coalition of merchants led by the National Retail Federation angered by 
the Board’s decision to raise the fee cap from its initial proposal.22 The Supreme Court declined to 
hear the case, and the $0.21 cap remains.23  
3.  Impact of Regulatory Intervention. Given that more than six years have passed since the 
debit fee cap was implemented, it is important to consider whether Durbin has had its intended 
effect on banks, merchants, and consumers.   
Bank impact. Interchange income dropped instantaneously after Durbin. Figure 1 shows 
that the decrease is concentrated in banks above the $10 billion threshold, suggesting that large 
issuers bore the brunt of Durbin, as intended. Losses for banks above the Durbin threshold total 
approximately $6.5 billion per year, constituting a 25% decrease in interchange revenue.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Federal Reserve requests comment on a proposed rule to establish debit card interchange fee standards and 
prohibit network exclusivity arrangements and routing restrictions. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYST. 
(Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20101216a.htm. 
20 TCF lost in district court in South Dakota and lost its appeal in the Eighth Circuit. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke 
(TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011). 
21 Both Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Sheila Bair, former Chair of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), voiced these concerns. In response, an amendment was offered to delay the 
implementation of Durbin until an FDIC study ascertaining its impact on community banks was completed. This bill 
failed by only six votes. See Evan Weinberger, Bernanke Questions Small Bank Swipe Fee Exemption, LAW360 (Feb. 
17, 2011), https://www.law360.com/articles/225275/bernanke-questions-small-bank-swipe-fee-exemption (last 
visited on June 11, 2018). See also On the Eve of Implementation, Fed Chairman Bernanke and FDIC Chairman Bair 
Still “‘Concerned”’ that Debit Card Rule Exemption for Small Financial Institutions Won’t Work, ELECTRONIC 
PAYMENTS COALITION (MAY 12, 2011), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/on-the-eve-of-implementation-
fed-chairman-bernanke-and-fdic-chairman-bair-still-concerned-that-debit-card-rule-exemption-for-small-financial-
institutions-wont-work-121734093.html (last visited on Jun. 2, 2018). 
22 NACS v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S.CT. 1170 (2015). 
23 Id.  
24 This estimate understates bank losses because banks report interchange revenue only if it constitutes more than 
3% of non-interest income. Ten percent of banks above the Durbin threshold that reported interchange income in Q3 
2011 no longer reported it in Q4 2011. 
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Figure 1 
 
Notes: Data from bank regulatory filings (Call Reports) 
Decreasing banks’ interchange revenue was, of course, Durbin’s purpose. However, banks 
warned that they would be forced to recover lost revenue by increasing other consumer fees. Bank 
of America asserted that “while producing a windfall to large merchants, the [Federal Reserve’s] 
Proposal will force the Bank to [recover] lost revenue . . . through increased consumer costs”25 and 
TCF, which challenged the Durbin Amendment’s constitutionality, stated, “Who is going to pay 
for this? That Customer that gets that debit card for free.”26 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the largest banks (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, 
Suntrust, and Regions Financial) initially proposed a fee on debit purchases to recoup Durbin 
losses: $5 every month when consumers used their debit cards as a means of purchase. This fee 
was abandoned because of consumer outrage. A bank consultant noted that the result would be a 
decrease in salient fees, and instead banks “are going to have to hide the fees and the customers 
will still have to pay for them.” 27 
In practice, this is exactly what happened. Figures 2 and 3 below show the impact of Durbin 
on free checking and monthly fees associated with bank checking accounts. Post-Durbin, the 
availability of free checking accounts decreased by more than 40% for covered issuers—in the 
pre-Durbin period, nearly 60% of large banks offered free checking; post-Durbin, this share fell 
below 20%. Alternatively, checking account fees more than doubled from around $3 to more than 
                                                 
25 Karl. F. Kaufmann, Bank of America Comment Letter on Durbin Amendment, BANK OF AM. (Feb. 22, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/March/20110302/R-1404/R-
1404_022211_67233_584174234336_1.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2018). 
26 Brian J. Hurd. TCF Comment Letter on Durbin Amendment, TCF NAT’L BANK (Feb. 18, 2011).  
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/April/20110405/R-1404/R-
1404_030411_68936_437488369604_1.pdf (last visited on Jun. 27, 2018). 
27 Tara Siegel Bernard, In Retreat, Bank of America Cancels Debit Card Fee. N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/business/bank-of-america-drops-plan-for-debit-card-fee.html (last visited Mar. 
14, 2018). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224172 
 
8 
 
$7 for Durbin banks. Significantly, these increases are not related to general trends in banking—
there is no equivalent decrease in free checking, nor an increase in maintenance fees, for banks 
below the Durbin threshold.  
The increase in fees is borne primarily by low-income customers—monthly maintenance 
fees are waived for customers above a certain minimum threshold in their checking accounts (pre-
Durbin, this averaged $920, but Durbin banks raised this by nearly 40%, to $1,265). Some low-
income customers who were priced out of the market by higher fees may have turned to more-
expensive banking replacements such as check-cashing and payday lending facilities.28 In the most 
recent FDIC Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, more than 30% of respondents 
who previously had a bank account reported that they were now unbanked because account fees 
were too high and unpredictable.29 
Figure 2 
 
Notes: Data from RateWatch, which surveys bank branches weekly for fee information. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Bord (2017) provides suggestive evidence for this result, albeit in a different setting. He finds that an increase in 
bank fees (stemming from mergers) leads to closures of consumer checking accounts and a greater use of payday 
lending. Vitaly M. Bord, Bank Consolidation and Financial Inclusion: The Adverse Effects of Bank Mergers on 
Depositors, HARV. U. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/vbord/files/vbord_bank_consolidation_and_financial_inclusion_tu.pdf (last visited 
on Jun. 27, 2018). 
29 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2015/2015appendix.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). This growth in the 
unbanked and underbanked population has drawn attention and necessitates further study. A recent documentary, 
Spent, chronicles the difficulties faced by nearly 70 million American families without access to the traditional 
financial sector. http://www.spentmovie.com/ (last visited on Jun. 20, 2018). See also Michael S. Barr, Banking the 
Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121, 121 (2004) (discussing barriers to banking for low-income families).   
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Figure 3 
 
Notes: Data from RateWatch, which surveys bank branches weekly for fee information. 
Economists Natasha Sarin and Vladimir Mukharlyamov estimate that banks recovered 
nearly 60% of lost interchange revenue by increasing consumer fees.30 These firms likely 
recovered even more by pushing consumers toward unregulated credit, as discussed below.  
Merchant impact. Advocates of Durbin asserted that it would “enable smaller businesses 
and merchants to lower their costs and provide discounts for their customers.”31 As a result of 
Durbin, merchant interchange fees decreased by $6.5 billion annually. In a perfectly competitive 
world, these merchant savings would be passed through to consumers in the form of lower prices. 
But many were skeptical that consumers would see any benefit: Mark Pryor, a former Republican 
Arkansas senator, suggested that “[t]he consumer probably ends up paying for [the interchange 
regulation]. They’ll get you. You’re going to pay for it one way or another.”32 
Stock-price reaction to Durbin suggests that, as Senator Pryor predicted, merchant 
interchange savings were not fully passed through to consumers. The market capitalization of 
                                                 
30 Interestingly, some small banks appear to decrease fees during this same period, which these authors attribute to 
banks using Durbin-related fee increases by competitors as an opportunity to grow their market share. Natasha Sarin 
& Vladimir Mukharlyamov, The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Banks, Merchants, and Consumers (working 
paper) (2018).  These estimates are directionally consistent with Benjamin S. Kay et al., Bank Profitability and Debit 
Card Interchange Regulation: Bank Responses to the Durbin Amendment, BD. OF GOV. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYST. 
(2014), the only other empirical study that considers bank responses to the Durbin Amendment. 
31 Dick Durbin, Press Release, Durbin Sends Letter To Wall Street Reform Conferees On Interchange Amendment, 
DICK DURBIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, ILLINOIS (May 25, 2010), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/durbin-sends-letter-to-wall-street-reform-conferees-on-interchange-amendment (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).  
32 Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Swiped: Banks, Merchants, and Why Washington Doesn’t Work for You, HUFFPOST 
(Dec. 6, 2017) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/swipe-fees-interchange-banks-
merchants_n_853574.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224172 
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publicly traded retailers increased by nearly 50 basis points in response to Durbin.33 This stock 
price movement is consistent with public statements by large retailers: For example, The Home 
Depot said it gained $35 million per year from Durbin.34  
Evidence from merchant prices also suggests that retailers failed to pass through Durbin 
savings. Prices set by gas stations, supermarkets, and convenience stores whose costs fell 
significantly because of Durbin are statistically indistinguishable from those set by merchants with 
low (or no) interchange savings.35 And when surveyed, the sectors that experienced the greatest 
cost reduction report that they did not decrease prices in response to Durbin.36 
Durbin did not help all retailers. Small-ticket merchants without sufficient market power 
to negotiate with Visa and Mastercard saw their interchange rates rise, not fall, as the Board’s 
$0.21 debit interchange cap became a floor. These merchants raised prices.37 For example, 
Redbox, which provides movie rentals through vending machines, increased prices by 20% post-
Durbin.38 Parkmobile, a smartphone application that helps Washington, D.C. residents pay for 
parking, raised its fees by over 40%.39 Small business owners decried Durbin’s impact. An owner 
of New York coffee houses said: “[M]y choice is to raise prices, discount for cash, or get an 
ATM.”40 Another merchant said that when customers offer a card to purchase a banana, he gives 
it to them for free: “Just take the banana. Don’t give me the card.”41  
The vending-machine industry was especially hurt by Durbin: It increased interchange fees 
by more than 200%.42 Visa struck agreements with payment processors for this industry.43 
However, Mastercard refused to negotiate a lower rate, leading many vending machines to drop 
                                                 
33 These results are consistent with prior work by Professor David Evans who, with a different  event study approach, 
estimate that over time consumers will lose between $22–$25 billion from Durbin. David S. Evans et al., “The Impact 
of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis,” U. CHI. L. 
SCHOOL COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR L. & ECON. (2013) (working paper). 
34 Q4 2010 Home Depot, Inc. Earnings Conference Call, THE HOME DEPOT INC. (Feb. 2011), http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9ODMwMTB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1 (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2018).  
35 Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30.  
36 Zhu Wang et al., The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Merchants: A Survey Study, FED. RES. BANK OF 
RICHMOND ECON. Q. (2014). The authors survey 420 merchants across 26 sectors and find that only four sectors 
decrease price in response to Durbin (Art, Automobiles, Sporting Goods, and Other); and even in these four sectors, 
prices fall for less than 6% of merchants.  
37 See, e.g., id.; Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30.  
38 Daniel Indiviglio, Angry that Redbox Is Hiking DVD Rental Prices? Blame Congress, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/10/angry-that-redbox-is-hiking-dvd-rental-prices-blame-
congress/247535/ (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
39 Parkmobile eventually had to apologize when Senator Durbin wrote a letter calling their claim “grossly 
misleading” since it was Visa and Mastercard’s reaction to the Durbin Amendment, not the legislation itself, that 
resulted in higher costs for Parkmobile. Robin Sidel, Debit-Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768 (last visited on Mar. 24 
2018). 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Apriva Extends Agreement with Visa to Offer Discounted Vending-Machine Pricing, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS, 
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/apriva-extends-agreement-with-visa-to-offer-discounted-
vending-machine-pricing/ (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018).  
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Mastercard debit from their list of accepted payment methods until a deal similar to Visa’s was 
eventually reached years later.44  
 
Credit impact. Durbin was not the first legislative attempt to rein in interchange fees. 
Interestingly, earlier iterations focused on credit rather than debit  fees.45 This is both because 
credit interchange fees were historically higher and because legislators hoped to dissuade 
merchants and banks from encouraging consumers to overuse credit cards, which can lead to 
expensive cycles of indebtedness.   
The latter was exactly the rationale for the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 2003 decision to 
intervene in this market by capping credit interchange fees at 0.55% of total transaction value. The 
RBA’s primary objective “was to change the relative prices of credit cards and debit cards to 
cardholders . . . reducing the substantial incentive to use credit cards over debit cards.”46  
Despite the fact that the Australian case-study was well-known to policymakers during the 
Durbin debate,47 the legislation eventually targeted debit interchange. This was in response to a 
substantial lobbying effort by banks and credit card networks, who warned that any restriction on 
credit interchange would lead issuers to “squeeze credit and raise the cost of credit cards at a time 
when the economy thirsts for credit to sustain an economic recovery.”48  In fact, Durbin lauded the 
Amendment’s focus on debit interchange, noting that as a result it would avoid any undesirable 
credit supply impact.49   
However, in capping debit interchange, the Durbin Amendment perversely increased the 
use of credit relative to its cheaper and less pernicious debit counterpart. David Evans, an academic 
with extensive background in payment systems, commented on the irony: 
 
Debit cards . . . are the responsible man’s plastic. You are only using the money you have, 
it comes right out of your checking account, so if you’re concerned about consumer debt, 
you want people to be using debit cards more. . . . It makes no sense for the Dodd-Frank 
Act to include an amendment that is going to make debit cards less available for consumers, 
                                                 
44 Id. In 2015 after a hiatus of more than three years, vending machines that get payment services through USA 
Technologies began accepting Mastercard debit again in January 2015.  
45 See, e.g., H.R. 6248, “Credit Card Interchange Fees Act of 2008 (“sponsored in the House by Representative 
Peter Welch); H.R. 5546, “The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008” (sponsored by Representative John Conyers, and in 
the Senate a companion bill S. 3086 sponsored by Durbin); S. 3252, “Credit Card Accountability and Responsibility 
Disclosure Act of 2008” (sponsored by Senator Chris Dodd).   
46 Michele Bullock, A Guide to the Card Payment System Reforms, RES. BANK AUS. (Sept. 2010),  
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2010/sep/7.html. 
47 See, e.g., Testimony of Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin (distinguishing the Durbin Amendment from its Australian 
predecessor: “The Reserve Bank of Australia actually regulates credit card interchange on a cost basis. We are 
obviously looking just at debit card interchange.”). 
48 Keith Bradsher, U.S. Looks to Australia on Credit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/25card.html. The implications of a 
potential credit squeeze were especially worrying for minority groups, who historically have less credit access than 
their white counterparts. CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, “ACCESS DENIED: LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY FAMILIES FACE 
MORE CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND HIGHER BORROWING COSTS” (2007). 
49 Press Release, Durbin Sends Letter to Wall Street Reform Conferees on Interchange Amendment, DICK DURBIN, 
UNITED STATES SENATOR, ILLINOIS (May 25, 2010), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-
sends-letter-to-wall-street-reform-conferees-on-interchange-amendment. 
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and it’s going to have the unavoidable consequences to push them towards credit. I think 
it’s nuts.50 
 
In response to Durbin, banks do appear to have pushed consumers toward credit usage.51 
For example, spending on credit card rewards among big issuers more than doubled since 201052 
while debit rewards programs were largely eliminated.53 Visa’s CEO Joe Saunders highlighted this 
trend and noted that it is “what one would expect” from legislation capping debit, but not credit, 
interchange.54 Unsurprisingly, credit usage grew more in the three years following Durbin’s 
enactment than in any other three year period since 2000.55 The push toward credit is especially 
problematic for low-income consumers for two reasons—first, it can lead to an expensive cycle of 
debt; and second, for consumers without credit access, the population-wide growth in credit usage 
increases costly subsidization by debit and cash users of their credit counterparts.56  
 
B. The CARD Act 
 
1.  The Policy Problem. In 1980, credit card contracts were a page long. Today, the average 
contract is more than 30 pages. Professor and now-Senator Elizabeth Warren called this a move 
toward the inclusion of “tricks and traps that would obscure the true cost of credit—and drive 
profits through the roof.”57 To some extent, she was right.  
Card fees have exploded since the late 1990s, when the Supreme Court allowed issuers to 
apply lax (or non-existent) limitations on fees from their home states to borrowers in other states.58 
Penalty fees accounted for more than half of the $24 billion in credit card fees U.S. cardholders 
paid in 2004 and 12.5% of issuers’ revenues.59 Various credit card contract terms enabled issuers 
to extract maximum fees. For example, card companies did not have to provide advance notice of 
default or penalty-rate increases; either could rise without warning when cardholders applied for a 
                                                 
50   Martin Neal Baily, Reasonable Regulation of Debit Card Fees (Transcript), PYMTS.com (May 2, 
2011), https://www.pymnts.com/news/2011/martin-neal-baily-reasonable-regulation-of-debit-card-fees-transcript/ 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
51 As an example, in September 2011 Chase distributed a brochure to explain that credit is a superior payment 
instrument to debit for all purchases. Arin H. Smith, Note, Durbin’s Defect: The Impact of Post-Recession Legislation 
on Low Income Consumers, 89 N.Y.U L. REV. 363, 369 n.17, 369–70 (2014). 
52 Credit Card Rewards More Than Doubled Since the Recession, New Study Shows, MAGNIFY MONEY BLOG (May 
4, 2017), http://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/credit-card-issuers-doubled-spending-rewards840948580/ (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
53 Richard Kerr, Where Have All the Rewards Cards Gone? THE POINTS GUY (June 24, 2015), 
https://thepointsguy.com/2015/06/rewards-debit-cards-gone/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
54 Q1 2012 Visa Inc. Earnings Conference Call (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:00 PM), 
https://s1.q4cdn.com/050606653/files/doc_financials/transcript/2012/V-Transcript-2012-Q1-2012.pdf  
55 Survey of Consumer Payments. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study-
20161222.pdf 
56 This is because prices are equivalent, regardless of payment instrument; and yet credit card users also receive 
valuable rewards. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Priceless?  The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1358 (2008) (discussing the distributional consequences of the payments system, noting that 
“[i]n its worst form, food stamp consumers are subsidizing first-class frequent flier upgrades.”) 
57 Benjamin Sarlin, Elizabeth Warren Talks Bank Reform, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 21, 2010), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/elizabeth-warren-talks-bank-reform (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
58 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
59 Nadia Massoud et al., The Cost of Being Late: The Case of Credit Card Penalty Fees 2-3 (AM. FIN. ASS’N 2007 
Chicago Meetings Paper, 2006); see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58.  
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mortgage or made a large purchase that lowered their credit score.60 Although introductory teaser 
rates are presented to consumers up front, other fees—such as late fees, over-limit fees, bounced-
check fees, convenience and service fees, fees for statement copies and replacement cards, foreign-
currency conversion fees, phone-payment convenience fees, wire-transfer fees, and balance-
transfer fees—are buried deep in increasingly complex contracts.61 Consumer inattention to these 
less-salient terms precipitated a status quo whereby consumers unknowingly incurred avoidable 
expenses.62 
2.  Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. Given widespread outrage, interventions 
in this market began during the Recession. In May 2007, the Federal Reserve proposed revisions 
to the Truth in Lending Act, and in February 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
testified before Congress that the Federal Reserve planned to use its authority to prohibit unfair or 
deceptive credit card practices. 63  Its May 2008 proposed rules focused on protecting customers 
from unexpected increases in interest rates or penalty fees, ending two-cycle billing,64 and 
prohibiting card issuers from creating a “cycle of debt” for subprime borrowers by opening 
accounts likely to generate astronomical fee revenue.65  
In tandem, Congress focused on the consumer credit market. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) 
introduced the “Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights,” which passed the House in September 2008 
(but was never considered in the Senate). The bill was reintroduced in January 2009, only one 
month after the Federal Reserve issued its final rules to regulate card company practices.66 In April 
2009, both the House and the Senate overwhelmingly passed (357–70 and 90–5 votes, 
respectively) the reintroduced bill, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act (“ CARD Act”). The effective date for the Federal Reserve’s rules was several months after 
the CARD Act, meaning it superseded the Board’s proposals. The CARD Act adopted many of 
the same prohibitions (e.g., limiting unexpected interest rate hikes) and added terms to limit credit 
                                                 
60 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58. 
61 Professors Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson discuss the tendency of firms to shroud information from less-
sophisticated customers. One example they provide is bank accounts:  
For example, banks prominently advertise the virtues of their accounts, but the marketing materials do not 
highlight the costs of an account which include ATM usage fees, bounced check fees, minimum balance fees, 
etc. Banks could compete on these costs, but they instead choose to shroud them. Indeed, many bank 
customers do not learn the details of the fee stricture until long after they have opened their accounts.  
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in 
Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 540 (2006). 
62 See Gregory Bresiger, People Are Unaware of How Much They Spend on Bank Fees, N.Y. POST (July 16, 2016, 
6:45 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/07/16/people-are-unaware-of-how-much-they-spend-on-bank-fees/ (last visited 
on Jun. 11, 2018). 
63 Vikram Jambulapati & Joanna Stavins, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: What Did Banks Do? FED. RES. BANK OF 
BOSTON (2013) (providing a detailed discussion of the CARD Act’s staged legislative history). 
64 That is, when a consumer pays the entire balance one month but fails to do so the following month, and the bank 
calculates interest for the second month using days in the previous cycle as well as the current cycle. 
65 Highlights of Final Rules Regarding Credit Card Accounts, FED. RES. BD. OF GOVERNORS (Dec. 2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20081218a1.pdf (last visited on Jun 11, 2018). 
66 Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, The Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights (Feb. 6, 2008), 
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/credit-cardholders%E2%80%99-bill-rights-balanced-reform 
(last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
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availability for college students, which regulators hoped would decrease the likelihood that young 
borrowers would get trapped in a lifetime of debt.67   
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. The CARD Act changed the economics of the credit 
card business by turning a short-term revolving unsecured loan, which could reprice when signals 
of consumer riskiness (or delinquency) materialized, into a longer-term unsecured loan with lower 
ability to price discriminate by risk type. Opponents of the CARD Act warned that the result would 
be higher interest rates for consumers across the board and a decrease in credit supply.68  
It is important to consider the impact of the CARD Act on the price and availability of 
consumer credit. Estimates suggest the CARD Act reduced overall credit card fees by nearly $25 
per account annually, resulting in total cost savings for credit card users of nearly $12 billion per 
year.69 These savings were largest (nearly $60 per account per year) for the least-credit-worthy 
borrowers—that is, those with a FICO score below 660.70  Overall, these savings represent a 
decrease in account fees of over 20%.71  
Despite early anecdotal evidence to the contrary,72 most academic work finds little support 
for the notion that card companies offset the CARD Act’s fee losses through increases in interest 
rates or other unregulated fees.73 There appears to be no increase in interest rates in response to 
the CARD Act, either on existing accounts or on new accounts, which are less constrained by the 
CARD Act’s repricing restrictions. However, there is some evidence that unregulated fees less 
salient to consumers—such as cash advance APRs—increased slightly in response to the CARD 
Act.74  
Evidence on the CARD Act’s impact on credit supply is more mixed. While some authors 
find no impact on credit availability (e.g., no lower credit limits or more account closures75) others 
                                                 
67 For this Article, I focus on the aspects of the CARD Act that regulated issuers’ back-end credit card contract 
terms rather than other features; for example requirements that issuers’ assess borrowers’ ability-to-repay before 
providing credit. These too had unintended consequences: Until the CARD Act was amended, one group of borrowers 
who found their access to credit restricted is spouses or partners who do not work outside the home. See The CFPB 
Amends Card Act Rule to Make It Easier for Stay-at-Home Spouses and Partners to Get Credit Cards, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/the-cfpb-amends-
card-act-rule-to-make-it-easier-for-stay-at-home-spouses-and-partners-to-get-credit-cards/ (last visited on Jun. 11, 
2018).  
68 See, e.g., Tomoeh Murakami Tse, JP Morgan’s Dimon Says New Laws Have Hurt His Company, WASH. POST 
(Apr 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/01/AR2010040103684.html (last 
visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
69 See generally Agarwal et al., supra note 2 (provides the most exhaustive empirical work done on the impact of 
the CARD Act to date. The authors use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card accounts and adopt a 
difference-in-difference research design, comparing changes in outcomes over time for consumer credit cards (subject 
to the new regulations) to small business cards (which were exempted)).  
70 Those with a FICO score above 660 experienced a smaller decline in fees, of around $7.90 per account. Id.  
71 Id.   
72 Eileen Connelly, Mixed Blessing: Credit Card Reform May Shock Some, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/mixed-blessing-credit-card-reform-may-shock-some/ (last visited on Mar. 14, 
2018). 
73 One recent exception is economist Scott Nelson who suggests that the CARD Act’s limits on interest-rate 
adjustment resulted in across-the-board higher interest rates on average for all borrowers at origination. However, he 
concludes that the reduction in lender rents outweighs the impact of higher prices, “so that on net, the Act’s restrictions 
allow consumers of all credit scores to capture higher surplus on average.” Scott T. Nelson, Private Information and 
Price Regulation in the US Credit Card Market, (2018) (working paper).   
74 Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 2.  
75 Agarwal et al., supra note 2 (finding the CARD Act had but unable to rule out an impact on the number of new 
accounts).  
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find the probability of account closure nearly doubled.76 This discrepancy is attributable to the 
different stages of the CARD Act: Although the Act was passed in May 2009, the Board proposed 
similar rules in May 2008. Thus, although there is no increase in account closures after the CARD 
Act’s passage, there appears to be an increase in account closures after the Board’s earlier 
proposal.77 But given that this earlier proposal coincides with the Recession, it is difficult to 
establish causally that increases in account closures are attributable to imminent credit card pricing 
restrictions rather than to the general economic downturn.78  
Recent work suggests that the CARD Act did in fact decrease credit supply for subprime 
borrowers.79 The existence of a supply-side credit effect, especially for the subprime, is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence and industry remarks at the time. 80 For example, JPMorgan Chase CEO 
Jamie Dimon said the bank would no longer offer credit cards to 15% of its customers, who became 
too risky to be attractive to the bank in light of the CARD Act’s restrictions.81 In its recent 
assessment of the CARD Act, the American Bankers Association highlighted that it decreased 
credit availability for subprime borrowers, noting that from 2008 to 2016, total credit card accounts 
for superprime borrowers rose from 151 million to 176 million while total credit card accounts for 
subprime borrowers fell from 89 million to 73 million.   
Still, on aggregate, this credit supply effect is outweighed by a decrease in lender rents.82 
The overall equilibrium effect of the CARD Act is an increase in consumer surplus estimated to 
be approximately $12 billion annually.83 This finding is consistent with estimates from the CFPB, 
which argues that the total cost of consumer credit declined by two percentage points between 
2008 and 2012.84 Thus, credit card issuers appeared to be much less focused on offsetting losses 
from the CARD Act than debit card issuers were on offsetting losses relating to Durbin. I consider 
the reasons for this difference in Part III, when contemplating policy lessons that can be drawn 
from these case studies.  
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 63. 
77 Id. Unfortunately, banks’ reaction to the Board’s proposed rules has not been considered by many academics in 
this space, for example Agarwal et al., supra note 2; and Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 2.. Professor Todd Zwyicki 
makes this argument in his critique of Agarwal et al., supra note 2: “The entire paper rests on a fatal flaw in the 
authors’ understanding of the regulatory regime they examine.” Todd Zywicki, No, the Credit Card Act Is Not a Free 
Lunch, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/13/no-
the-credit-card-act-is-not-a-free-lunch/?utm_term=.69fc36720335 (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).   
78 Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 63 (making clear that it is difficult to determine whether the cause of account 
closures “was the economic downturn or preemptive action in anticipation of the new legislation”).  
79 Nelson, supra note 73. 
80 See, e.g. Connelly, supra note 43. 
During the past nine months, credit card companies jacked up interest rates, created new fees and cut credit 
lines. They also closed down millions of accounts. So, a law hailed as the most sweeping piece of consumer 
legislation in decades has helped make it more difficult for millions of Americans to get credit, and made 
that credit more expensive.  
81 Id.  
82 Nelson, supra note 73. 
83 Agarwal et al., supra note 2.  
84 CARD Act Report: A review of the impact of the CARD Act on the consumer credit market, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 1, 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf (last 
visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
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C.  Overdraft 
 
1.  The Policy Problem. An overdraft occurs when a customer attempts to withdraw an 
amount from her checking account, either through an ATM withdrawal or point-of-sale purchase, 
that exceeds the funds available in her account. Banks earn overdraft revenue by allowing 
customers to complete these transactions for a fee. Historically, institutions determined whether to 
cover overdraft transactions on a case-by-case basis based on customer and overdraft 
characteristics. In the early 2000s, banks began transitioning to automated overdraft programs—
often designed by third-party vendors85—to maximize bank overdraft revenue by, for example, 
ordering customer overdrafts by size and advertising overdraft to customers as a simple way to 
meet short-term borrowing needs.86 As a result, fee income on deposit accounts87 increased by 
more than 90% between 1999 and 2009 (see Figure 4). In 2006, overdraft fees accounted for 
around 6% of banks’ total net operating revenues.88   
 
Figure 4 
 
Notes: Data from bank regulatory filings (Call Reports) 
 
                                                 
85 FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, FED. DEPOSIT INS. COMM’N. (Nov. 2008), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/fdic138_report_final_v508.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
86 Id. 
87 Until 2015, bank overdraft fees were not reported as a line item on financial filings. Instead, “Service Charges on 
Deposit Accounts” includes overdraft and other fees, including check-cashing fees and monthly maintenance fees on 
deposit accounts. But overdraft fees, at least prior to changes to Reg-E, were responsible for a sizable fraction of 
service charges on deposit accounts. The FDIC estimated that fees related to non-sufficient funds (NSF) were over 
75% of total service charges on deposit accounts in 2006. Id.   
88 Id.  
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Overdraft revenue is generated primarily by repeat overdrafters. Before the Recession, 
about 75% of accounts had no overdraft incidents, 12% had one to four, 5% had five to nine, 4% 
had 10 to 19, and only 5% had more than 20 overdrafts annually. Customers with more than 10 
overdraft transactions—fewer than 10% of all checking account customers—accrued 84% of the 
reported overdraft fees.89 These customers are less financially sophisticated and typically lower-
income: In 2006, 40% of low-income customers overdrafted, compared to only 20% of their high-
income counterparts. Low-income customers are also twice as likely to be frequent overdrafters.90   
Overdraft is essentially a very high-interest loan: Assuming, for example, a $27 overdraft 
fee,91 a customer repaying a $20 point-of-sale overdraft in two weeks would incur an APR of 
3,520%. Banks offer much cheaper ways to complete overdraft transactions, for example, by 
opening an overdraft line of credit (usually an APR of around 18%) or linking a checking account 
to a savings/credit card account (costing at most a $5 flat fee).92 Given the availability of cheaper 
alternatives, banks’ ability to generate overdraft revenue, especially from repeat overdrafters, is 
puzzling. One possible explanation for overdrafts is consumer inattention—nearly all consumers 
who overdraft said they were unaware they were doing so.93 The lack of salience of these fees to 
the consumers who bear them enables banks to generate significant overdraft revenue.  
Prior to recent updates to overdraft rules, most bank customers were automatically opted 
in to overdraft protection. Given the rapid increase in overdraft fees since the early 1990s and their 
incidence on the least financially sophisticated, both popular commentators94 and regulators95 
voiced concern. 
2.  Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. In 2005, the Federal Reserve amended 
Regulation DD,96 which implements the Truth in Savings Act, to require additional disclosures 
about overdraft services and rein in misleading advertisements—for example, representing an 
overdraft service as a line of credit or describing overdraft protection as free.97 Banks were also 
required to disclose total overdraft fees incurred in periodic account statements.98 Regulators 
hoped these disclosures would make overdraft fees salient to consumers and push them toward 
cheaper alternatives.  
                                                 
89 CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 88.  
90 FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 89.  Seven-point-five percent of low-income customers 
experienced 20 or more overdraft incidents in a year, compared to only 3.8% of high-income customers.  
91 Median for the FDIC study. Id.   
92 Id.  
93 Overdraft America: Confusion and Concerns about Bank Practices, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES (May 2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/sciboverdraft20america1pdf.pdf (last 
visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
94 Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is a Boon for Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/09debit.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
One New York Times editorial called for regulators to “move quickly and aggressively to protect consumers.” Editorial, 
Debit Card Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/opinion/20thu1.html (last visited 
on Jun. 27, 2018). The editorial offered vivid anecdotes, for example, of a college student who “made seven small 
purchases including coffee and school supplies that totaled $16.55 and was hit with overdraft fees that totaled $245.” 
See id.; see also Editorial, That $35 Cup of Coffee, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/opinion/14sat2.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018)  
95 FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 89 (citing a 2006 FDIC study to gather data on overdraft 
programs in response to the growth in automated overdraft).  
96 12 CFR Part 1030. 
97 FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 89 (citing § 226.4(c)(3)). 
98 Id. 
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Despite this intervention, overdraft fee income for banks and credit unions rose 35% from 
2006 to 2008.99 The Board then amended Regulation E100 to change the default rules for overdraft. 
In January 2009, it requested comment on two policy defaults: (1) an opt-out default, which would 
prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless customers were given notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to opt out of overdraft protection and chose not to; and (2) an opt-in default, which 
would prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless customers affirmatively opted in.  
The final rule adopted an opt-in approach.101 In selecting this policy default, the Board 
sought to address the lack of salience of overdraft fees to consumers. Specifically, it noted that 
“consumers may unintentionally overdraft their account based on the erroneous belief that a 
transaction would be paid only if the consumer has sufficient funds in the account to cover it.”102 
Because consumers are likely to adhere to established defaults,103 the Board believed the opt-in 
regime would help prevent expensive and frequent overdraft incidents.104 
The new opt-in default was meant to be a strong nudge against overdraft protection: The 
Board concluded that consumers, if made aware of the cost of overdrafting, would prefer such 
transactions be declined and amended the default rule accordingly. This view is consistent with 
the Board’s own internal testing105 and surveys,106 which demonstrate a majority of overdrafters 
would prefer that transactions incurring overdraft fees not be completed.  
3.  Impact of Regulatory Intervention. In commenting on the likely impact of changes to 
Regulation E, industry experts predicted that the result would be higher fees or a reduction in bank 
services given that “overdraft fees . . . subsidize other checking account features consumers enjoy, 
such as maintenance-fee-free checking accounts, and free online payment.”107 It is important to 
consider the actual impact of the new overdraft opt-in regime. 
Figure 4 above shows that overdraft revenue decreased significantly immediately 
following changes to the overdraft default rules. Service charges on deposit accounts declined by 
                                                 
99 Leslie Parrish, Overdraft Explosion: Bank fees for Overdrafts Increase 35% in Two Years, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/crl-overdraft-
explosion.pdf (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
100 12 CFR Part 1005. 
101 Changes to Regulation E involve only ATM and point-of-sale overdrafts. Overdrafts for check or scheduled 
recurring payments are not subject to the new opt-in requirement.  
102 74 Fed. Reg. 220, 59039.  
103 As support for this proposition, the Federal Reserve Board cited Brigette Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149 (2001); and Gabriel D. Carroll 
et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1639 (2009). Both studies are of automatic enrollment 
in 401(k) savings plans and find a significant increase in employee participation when the default rule is enrollment 
rather than a default that requires employees agree to participation.  
104 See Todd Zywicki, Behavioral Law and Economics and Bank Overdraft Protection, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 
20, 2013, 7:19 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/11/20/behavioral-law-economics-bank-overdraft-protection/ (last visited 
on Jun. 11, 2018). 
105 See Design and Testing of Overdraft Notices: Phase Two, ICF MACRO (Oct. 12, 2009), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20091112a4.pdf (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
Most consumers indicated that they would prefer an opt-in to an opt-out regime for ATM and point-of-sale 
transactions, because these transactions tend to be discretionary in nature.  
106 A 2012 Pew study reports that more than 75% of people who reported overdrafting said that they would have 
preferred the non-recurring debit transactions be declined. Overdraft America, supra note 97.  
107 Id.  
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14% in the year following the Board’s changes. Banks do not appear to have recovered these 
losses.108  
Despite the decrease in overdraft revenue associated with the new opt-in regime, some 
academics have cited it as an example of a failed nudge, or a “slippery default,”109 cautioning that, 
given an asymmetry in information and sophistication (as with naïve and inattentive consumers 
contracting with financial firms), policy defaults fail to stick because motivated firms are focused 
on persuading consumers to opt out of the default (in this case, by opting in to overdraft protection). 
Any appearance of consumer choice is therefore illusory.110    
Professor Lauren Willis suggests that banks made the overdraft default position costly by 
bombarding customers with marketing and phone calls111 so “consumers quickly realized that there 
[was] an immediate intangible benefit to opting out—the marketing will stop. The calls and emails 
will cease, the tellers will stop asking, and those who bank online will be able to navigate directly 
to their personal account without clicking through a computer screen asking whether they would 
like to opt out first.”112  
Certainly, some banks aggressively focused on opting customers in to overdraft protection. 
TCF is being sued by the CFPB for improper opt-in practices,113 including firing employees who 
fail to maintain an 80% opt-in rate for new accounts, publicly shaming branch managers who fail 
to meet their opt-in goals, failing to make clear to customers that opting in is a choice,114 and 
offering emotional hypotheticals in the rare cases of customer resistance to overdraft protection.115 
                                                 
108 In fact, overdraft revenue may have decreased further since 2010. We know that “Service Charges on Deposit 
Accounts” includes monthly maintenance fees, which double for banks above the $10 billion threshold in response to 
the Durbin Amendment. See Figure 3.  
109 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 4. Citing Professor Willis, Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes use the overdraft 
opt-in default as an example of a setting in which “behavioral economics trims its sails” and a case for which a policy 
mandate (here, no overdraft protection) is preferable. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5. 
110 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5.  
111 Willis, supra note 4, at 1188 (citing Phil Villareal, When It Comes to Overdraft Opt-In, Chase Won’t Take No 
for an Answer, CONSUMERIST (Aug. 6, 2010), https://consumerist.com/2010/08/06/when-it-comes-to-overdraft-opt-
in-chase-wont-take-no-for-an-answer/ (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018)). 
112 Id. 
113 CFPB’s complaint was two-fold: first, that TCF engaged in abusive and deceptive practices to opt in new 
consumers barred by Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and second, that it violated Regulation E’s opt-in 
requirement for new and existing customers. The latter has been dismissed. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. 
TCF National Bank, Civ. No. 17-166 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2017/09/TCF-Order-17cv166-2.pdf. 
114 To encourage existing customers to opt in, bank employees engaged in an aggressive telephone campaign and 
asked consumers whether they would “like your TCF check card to continue to work as it does today?”—the majority 
said yes, and TCF considered a “yes” opting in to overdraft protection. The strategy was a successful one: TCF 
achieved an opt-in rate of 66%, more than three times the industry average. See CFPB Complaint, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau v. TCF National Bank, No. 0:17-cv-00166 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_TCF-National-Bank-complaint.pdf (last visited on Mar. 
14, 2018). 
115 Id. at 20:  
The major strategy would be to present an example of how it benefited the customer. It tugged at your heart 
strings. It usually was related to an emergency situation in which you needed funds. [For example] ‘We live 
in Minnesota too. It is cold outside. You are on the side of the road. You know your account has $50 in it. 
You know to get a service call it is going to cost you $80. You have to get it fixed. So you make that call. If 
you are opted in, we will pay it. You get an overdraft fee. If you don’t Opt-In, it declines you. You might get 
stuck on the side of the road, kind of like scare tactics.’ 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224172 
 
20 
 
But TCF is the exception, not the rule.116 Relying on vivid anecdotal evidence about particular 
banks’ opt-in practices fails to capture the reality that there is substantial heterogeneity in bank 
responses to the new overdraft regime.   
Large banks mostly moved away from overdraft as a product. Bank of America, JPMorgan 
Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citibank, which together account for more than 35% of total domestic 
deposits,117 exceed the opt-in requirements of Regulation E. In March 2010, Bank of America 
eliminated entirely overdraft protection on point-of-sale purchases, a substantial move given that 
debit purchases accounted for roughly 60% of its overdraft fee income.118 More recently, in 2014, 
Bank of America launched a new a “SafeBalance” checking account to prevent customers from 
overdrafting when withdrawing cash from ATMs or paying bills (including check payments not 
covered by the new opt-in regime).119 In July 2012, JPMorgan Chase decided to end overdraft 
charges on small transactions (purchases of $5 or less).120 In June 2017, Wells Fargo began 
notifying customers via email when their account balances drop to zero or less.121 Most recently, 
in November 2017, Wells Fargo also eliminated overdraft fees for small transactions (less than $5) 
and added a “rewind” option to eliminate the overdraft fees if a direct deposit large enough to 
cover the overdraft transactions is received by 9 A.M. the day after an account becomes 
negative.122 Citibank, even prior to changes to Regulation E, never allowed overdrafts on ATM or 
point-of-sale transactions.123 One reason the largest banks dislike overdraft as a product is its recent 
notoriety: Executives at two of these large banks124 suggest industry movement away from 
overdraft stems from reputational costs associated with being an overdraft gouger, and relatedly, 
the threat of litigation for abusive overdraft practices.125 
                                                 
116 Overdraft was such a successful product for TCF that Bill Cooper, the bank’s former chairman and CEO, dubbed 
his boat The Overdraft. Id. at 7. 
117 Bank call reports.  
118 See Dan Fitzpatrick and Robin Sidel, Bank of America Eliminates Overdraft Fees on Debit Buys, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704784904575112430638527738 (last visited on 
Jun. 11, 2018). Bank of America retains overdraft protection for ATM withdrawals but alerts customers who are about 
to overdraw their accounts that they will be charged a $35 fee if they proceed. Geoff Williams, Bank of America 
Announces New Information on Overdraft Policies, AOL (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.aol.com/2010/03/10/bank-of-
america-announces-new-information-on-overdraft-policies/ (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018).  
119 Melanie Hicken, BofA Rolls out Checking Account for Chronic Overdrafter, CNN MONEY (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/06/pf/bank-of-america-overdraft/index.html (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
120 Emily Cohn, Chase Overdraft Fee Won’t Apply to Purchases $5 or Less, HUFFPOST (June 20, 2012), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/20/chase-overdraft-fee-5-dollars_n_1613406.html (last visited on Mar. 14, 
2018). 
121 Robert Barbra, Wells Fargo Adds Overdraft Protection with Rewind, BANKRATE (Nov. 21, 2017). 
http://www.bankrate.com/banking/checking/wells-fargo-launches-overdraft-rewind/ (last visited on Mar. 14, 2018). 
122 See id. 
123 See Jane Quinn, Automatic Overdraft Protection: Just Say No, MONEYWATCH (Aug. 16, 2010), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/automatic-overdraft-protection-just-say-no/ (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
124 Anonymous interview (on file with author).  
125 Bank of America settled its overdraft lawsuit in November 2017 for $66 million. The complaint alleged that the 
overdraft fees were in fact interest and therefore subject to restrictions on usurious or excessive rates. See Gordon 
Gibb, Bank of America to Settle Excessive Fees Class Action for $66.6 Million, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM 
(Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/excessive-bank-overdraft-fees/excessive-bank-
overdraft-fees-43-22703.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018); Dena Aubin, Bank of America Settles Overdraft Lawsuit 
for $66.6 Million, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters com/article/us-bank-of-america-overdrafts/bank-of-
america-settles-overdraft-lawsuit-for-66-6-million-idUSKBN1D22ER (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). And Wells 
Fargo is currently the target of class action lawsuits around the country that accuse it of changing the order of debit 
card transactions—from highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount—with the sole purpose of increasing overdraft 
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Have overdraft losses been offset by increases in other types of bank fees? Figures 1 and 2 
above illustrate that free checking has decreased by 40% since 2010. However, this decrease is 
concentrated in banks above the $10 billion Durbin cut-off. Unlike Durbin, the new overdraft opt-
in regime applies to large and small banks alike. In fact, smaller banks, more dependent on 
overdraft as a source of revenue, were harder hit by the new opt-in default.126 As such, the fee 
increases observed appear to be more related to Durbin than to changes in banks’ overdraft 
policies, although disentangling the two is difficult.127  
As a result of the new overdraft regime, the share of bank customers opted in to overdraft 
protection (and thus capable of incurring overdraft fees) decreased from 100% to 16%.128 Even 
among frequent overdrafters, only 45% have opted in to overdraft protection.129 One way to 
interpret the higher opt-in rate for frequent overdrafters is that motivated banks seek to avoid the 
opt-in default for highly lucrative customers. Another interpretation of this evidence is that 
frequent overdrafters prefer overdraft protection to their transactions being declined.130  
It seems extreme to characterize as a “slippery default” a default rule that decreased the 
share of bank customers eligible to incur overdraft fees by nearly 85%.131 However, a valid concern 
is that banks may be focused on opting in the least financially sophisticated customers who 
generate the most overdraft revenue. Below, I consider additional behaviorally informed changes 
to the overdraft regime that could increase the salience of its costs to consumers but still preserve 
a role for consumer choice.   
  
                                                 
revenue, in violation of state competition laws. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 704 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2012); 
see also Associated Press, Wells Fargo Wants Court to Toss Overdraft Lawsuits and Let It Use Arbitration, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017, 3:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-20170824-story.html (last 
visited on Jun. 11, 2018). A similar charge was at the heart of the JPMorgan Chase litigation that resulted in a $110 
million settlement. Jonathan Stempel, JP Morgan Settles Overdraft Fee Case for $110 Million, REUTERS, (Feb. 7, 
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-overdraft-settlement/jpmorgan-settles-overdraft-fee-case-for-
110-million-idUSTRE8161CR20120207 (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
126 As a result, smaller banks are more focused on opting in customers to overdraft protection: community banks, 
for example, report opt-out rates of around 60%. Willis, supra note 4.  
127 Both were passed in Q2 2010, although changes to overdraft were previously proposed in 2008 and 2009. 
128 CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 88. The opt-in rate is 22% for new accounts, which are easier to 
opt in to because they involve more direct contact with consumers.  
129 Id.  
130 Professor Cass Sunstein suggests this rationale: for frequent overdrafters, “[i]t is plausible to think that opting in 
is a good idea. If they cannot borrow from their bank, they might have to borrow from someone else—which would 
mean a level of inconvenience . . . and potentially equivalent or higher interest rates.” Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. 
Shoves: The Benefits of Preserving Choice, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 215 (2014).  
131 Willis, supra note 4. 
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Table 1. Summary of Case Studies 
Case Study 
Cause(s) for 
Intervention 
Summary of 
Intervention 
Efficacy of 
Intervention 
Unintended 
Consequences of 
Intervention 
Durbin 
Amendment 
Interchange became 
a large operating 
cost for merchants 
as use of 
credit/debit for 
payment exploded.  
Card network 
market has 
monopoly-like 
features. 70% 
controlled by 
Visa/Mastercard. 
$0.21 cap on debit 
interchange 
collected from 
merchants. 
Bank interchange 
revenue fell by 
$6.5 billion 
annually. 
Monthly checking 
account fees 
doubled. 
Substantial 
decrease in free 
checking.   
Shifted consumers 
to credit. 
Increased 
interchange fees 
for small-ticket 
merchants.  
Higher checking 
account fees for 
consumers.  
CARD Act Rise in complexity 
of credit card 
contracts. 
Unanticipated 
consumer fees.  
Restricts 
unannounced fee 
increases and 
back-end penalty 
fees for late 
payment/exceeding 
credit limits. 
 
Fee reductions of 
$12 billion 
annually, with 
little evidence of 
offsetting increase 
in interest rates or 
reduction in credit 
volume.  
Some evidence of 
anticipatory 
decreases in credit 
availability.   
Overdraft 
Opt-In 
Overdraft revenue 
grew by more than 
100% in a decade, 
due to automated 
overdraft programs 
aimed at generating 
revenue; e.g., by 
ordering 
transactions for 
maximum 
overdrafts.  
Prohibit overdraft 
protection (and 
thus fees) unless 
customers opt-in, 
else transaction 
denied.  
Share of 
customers opted in 
to overdraft 
protection 
decreases from 
100% to 16% 
(22% for new 
customers).  
Banks dependent 
on overdraft target 
frequent 
overdrafters (10% 
are responsible for 
85% of overdraft 
revenue) for opt-
in; often poorest 
and least 
financially 
sophisticated.  
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II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The case studies in Part I show that recent consumer-payments regulations have had mixed 
efficacy. Part II begins to glean lessons from these interventions, providing a simplistic conceptual 
framework to establish that, in the presence of shrouded pricing, regulatory intervention can be 
effective.  
 
A.  Shrouded Information and Imperfect Markets 
 
This conceptual framework is built on the observation that banks regularly hide certain 
prices from consumers. Card issuers advertise low upfront pricing (for example, the introductory 
APR in large letters on envelopes to potential customers) but hide add-on costs those same 
customers are likely to incur (for example, higher interest rates when the introductory teaser offers 
expire and penalty fees for late payments). This framework sheds light on why price-shrouding 
occurs, its consequences, and why it persists in equilibrium.  
Consider the consumer checking account. For simplicity, imagine it has two components: 
a salient price ps (the monthly maintenance fee on the account), and a non-salient price pns, (the 
overdraft fee charged to a customer for an overdraft incident). ps is $90, pns is $20. First, note that 
the existence of price-shrouding leads to excessive credit card borrowing,132 excessive use of credit 
or debit cards to pay for transactions,133 and, in our example, too many checking accounts. How 
so? Assume there are two types of consumers, high-marginal-benefit consumers who derive a 
benefit of $110 from the consumer checking account, and low-marginal-benefit consumers, who 
derive a benefit of only $90. All consumers will need overdraft protection, but no consumers think 
they will. If costs were properly internalized by consumers, only high-marginal-benefit types 
would purchase checking accounts; however, believing the total cost is only $90, both high and 
low types will purchase them.  
Now assume awareness of the non-salient overdraft differs depending on customer 
sophistication. There are still two types of consumers: sophisticated, who consider both ps and pns 
when they make product decisions, and unsophisticated, who neglect pns. Both types have equal 
marginal benefits of $100.  Sneaky Bank’s total cost of servicing a checking account is $100. Thus, 
in a perfectly competitive world, the total revenue it generates from customers must also equal 
$100—any more, and the demand for its checking account will be 0; any less, and it will earn 
negative profits. Sophisticated customers avoid overdraft fees and pay only $90 for their checking 
accounts; unsophisticated consumers know no better and pay $110, both the $90 monthly fee and 
a $20 overdraft fee. This numerical example is summarized below.  
  
                                                 
132 See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2006)  (noting that “excessive 
borrowing, no less than insufficient savings, might be a product of bounded rationality”).   
133 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004) (highlighting that “teaser rates lead to 
excessive pre-distress borrowing, which in turn renders the consumer more vulnerable to financial hardships”).   
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Sneaky Bank   
Cost $100  
Ps (fee) $90  
Pns (overdraft) $20  
Customer   
Sophisticated pays  $90  
Unsophisticated pays  $110  
Profit  $0  
  
But what is to stop a competing bank from entering and being transparent about its pricing 
structure? If Transparent Bank offers a $100 price, inclusive of overdraft, and advertises as not 
engaging in sneaky price-shrouding, newly educated consumers would still prefer checking 
accounts at Sneaky Bank: Because they are now sophisticated they will get a product worth $100 
for only $90, plus some inconvenience cost to avoid overdrafting.134 
The result is an equilibrium where Sneaky Bank charges high add-on overdraft fees to 
exploit unsophisticated customers, and sophisticated customers take advantage of Sneaky Bank by 
avoiding high add-on costs and getting checking accounts at the loss-leader price. Unsophisticated 
consumers pay more for their checking accounts, thereby cross-subsidizing their sophisticated 
counterparts.  
Sophistication is costly on two dimensions: sophisticated consumers must (1) read through 
complex checking account contracts to locate non-salient terms and (2) be vigilant in avoiding 
fees, for example, by verifying that their account balances are positive regularly, or by carrying 
cash to make sure that they will never incur overdraft fees. If the total cost of understanding 
contract provisions, checking account balances, and keeping cash handy is $8, sophisticated 
consumers will still prefer expending this effort to save $2 ($90 in checking account fees + $8 to 
avoid overdraft costs) rather than signing on to Transparent Bank for a total cost of $100.  
What role can regulatory intervention play?135 Consider a regulator that is aware of 
shrouded prices and heterogeneous customer sophistication and intervenes, perhaps by capping 
the overdraft fee at $0.136 Now, banks can no longer charge pns but still need to cover their $100 
costs in equilibrium. As such, Sneaky Bank would fully offset this price regulation through an 
increase in ps: 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 This example is a simplistic version of the model presented in Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 61, at 508. The 
authors refer to the failure of the transparent bank to gain market share as illustrative of the “curse of debiasing”: 
“Sophisticated consumers tend to be less profitable because they know how to avoid unnecessary costs. In such cases, 
firms do not have an incentive to pursue debiasing and competition will not lead consumers to behave rationally.”  
135 Gabaix & Laibson briefly consider regulatory solutions for shrouded pricing, for example, enhanced disclosure 
and warning customers to pay attention to hidden costs. They are not very encouraging about the potential of regulatory 
price caps: “Finally regulators may impose markup caps on shrouded attributes. . . . However, even if good theoretical 
arguments exist for regulating shrouded fees, such regulations put us on a slippery slope that may produce great 
unintended harm. Mark-up regulations are often counterproductive.” Id. at 531. I heed this caution and attempt to 
highlight cases where price caps are likely to be minimally distortive.   
136 This is an extreme example, and illustrative only. For reasons I discuss in Part III, I believe capping overdraft 
fees at $0 is undesirable because it will  eliminate a product consumers may want despite its high cost. A more desirable 
cap would be to restrict overdraft fees to the cost of offering overdraft protection.  
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PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
MARKET  
(REGULATED) 
Sneaky Bank   
Cost $100  
Ps (fee) $100  
Pns (overdraft) $0  
Customer   
Sophisticated pays  $100  
Unsophisticated pays  $100  
Profit  $0  
 
In equilibrium, this regulatory intervention eliminates the cross-subsidy of the 
sophisticated by the unsophisticated.137 This benefit alone is sufficient to justify regulatory 
intervention on distributional grounds: A price cap can tilt the scales away from sophisticated 
consumers who have access to the checking account at a price below cost because of their less-
sophisticated counterparts. As an added benefit, regulation also eliminates costly behavior by the 
sophisticated, like spending time obsessively reading contracts and balancing accounts to avoid 
being overdrawn. Also, tackling price shrouding eliminates any inefficient over-use of the 
consumer checking account product: A consumer will weigh the marginal benefit of a checking 
account against its true cost, not an underestimated cost that ignores non-salient price attributes.  
Thus, even in a perfectly competitive world, the existence of price-shrouding suggests a 
role for regulatory intervention. Note that I propose behavioral differences between the two groups 
of consumers in this framework: sophisticated and aware of non-salient prices and unsophisticated 
and unaware. An alternative is a rational framework—high-type consumers have low marginal 
utility of income and thus are likely to use overdraft protection rather than expend energy reading 
contracts, hoarding cash, or searching for cheaper checking account alternatives. That is, wealthy 
consumers are likely to take advantage of expensive overdraft add-on, and poor consumers are 
likely to avoid it; thus, wealthy customers subsidize their poorer counterparts. This “traditional” 
explanation138 also generates a cross-subsidy that can be addressed by regulatory intervention; 
however, it appears unlikely to describe the reality of consumer finance markets, where consumers 
who bear penalty fees are disproportionately poorer and less financially sophisticated. With the 
behavioral cross-subsidy running from the less-sophisticated to the more, regulatory intervention 
can be justified on fairness and distributional grounds.  
                                                 
137 One question for those interested in these topics is why greater product diversity does not exist in the checking 
account market. For example, in this simplified world, it is possible to imagine a checking account without any 
overdraft protection being offered at a lower fee than a checking account with overdraft protection, because banks 
bear costs for offering overdraft protection. Literature in economics—notably A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, 
and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975) and Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition 
and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977) — suggests that imperfect competition can result in 
too little (but also too much) product diversity, depending on consumer demand. Interestingly, Bank of America 
recently reduced its product diversity, eliminating its low-cost eBanking checking accounts. See Colin Dwyer, Bank 
of America Ends Free Checking Option, A Bastion for Low-Income Customers, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/24/580324251/bank-of-america-ends-free-checking-option-a-
bastion-for-low-income-customers (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018).  
138 So termed by Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 Q. J. ECON. 585 (2005). 
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Next consider a world without perfect competition, in which banks have substantial market 
power. At least in the short-run, in an imperfectly competitive market, banks are able to generate 
positive profits, or rents.139 So, for example, Sneaky Bank can charge $105 for its checking 
account, even though it costs only $100 to provide it. Without regulatory intervention, 
sophisticated consumers pay $105, and unsophisticated consumers pay a whopping $125 for their 
checking accounts.  
  
IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
MARKET 
(UNREGULATED) 
Sneaky Bank   
Cost $100  
Ps (fee) $105  
Pns (overdraft) $20  
Customer   
Sophisticated pays  $105  
Unsophisticated pays  $120  
Profit  $15 
 
The difference between this imperfectly competitive case and the baseline of perfect 
competition is that now, the beneficiary of the non-sophisticated consumers’ naïveté is Sneaky 
Bank, not the sophisticated consumers.  
Why could sophisticated consumers not demand a lower price by threatening to educate 
the unsophisticated? This threat is not obviously credible. Sophisticated consumers would have to 
coordinate to spread their message; and even if they were able to, it is likely unsophisticated 
consumers would trust Sneaky Bank, the provider of their checking accounts, over the less-familiar 
sophisticated.  
A cap on the shrouded overdraft fee can help decrease checking account costs for the 
unsophisticated. Imagine the same regulatory intervention as above: Regulators cap overdraft fees 
at $0. In the perfectly competitive world, Sneaky Bank has to raise its price to cover its marginal 
costs. In this imperfectly competitive world, Sneaky Bank has positive profits and will not offset 
the losses from the non-salient price cap entirely, because its customers decide whether to open 
(and maintain) a checking account based on the salient monthly fee. That is, Sneaky Bank faces a 
trade-off: Raise salient fees for everyone and lower the quantity of checking accounts it provides, 
or keep salient fees as they are and still generate positive profits, albeit lower profits than it would 
generate in this absence of price regulation.  
Note that the lack of full offset is attributable to the fact that some consumers ignore non-
salient prices. There would be no similar tradeoff if regulators instead targeted salient prices—as 
long as there are other aspects of the pricing bundle to adjust, banks will fully offset these losses.  
 
 
 
                                                 
139 The particular nature of the non-perfectly competitive market (monopoly versus monopolistic competition) will 
dictate whether firms are able to generate quasi-rents (positive profits in the short run that will be competed away in 
the longer run) or long-run rents.  
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IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
MARKET 
(REGULATED) 
Bank   
Cost $100  
Ps (fee) $105  
Pns (overdraft) $0  
Customer   
Sophisticated pays  $105  
Unsophisticated pays  $105  
Profit  $5  
 
B.  Related Literature 
 
The insights presented in the framework are related to a long line of both legal and 
economics literature considering the existence of loss-leader140 pricing and its equilibrium effects 
on consumers and firms.141 For example, Professor Glenn Ellison considers an economy with two 
types of consumers: high types (with a high marginal utility of income) and low types (with a low 
marginal utility of income).142 In his framework, in equilibrium, high add-on prices are not 
competed away, and firms end up with positive profits because there is no incentive to lower price 
and attract more frugal consumers who will not consume the non-salient add-ons.143 Thus, the 
existence of shrouded pricing lowers competitive market pressures. In follow-on work, economists 
Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson provide a model of shrouded pricing in which firms have zero 
profit in equilibrium, but price-shrouding remains and creates a cross-subsidy of the sophisticated 
by their unsophisticated counterparts, as described above.144  
 Studies by economists Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney, and 
Johannes Stroebel, and Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Ryan Bubb are closely related to this 
particular framework. In their study of the CARD Act, both sets of authors point to (1) the shrouded 
nature of many of the fees the CARD Act sought to regulate and (2) the imperfectly competitive 
card-issuer market as theoretical explanations for their finding only limited offset of CARD Act 
                                                 
140 Loss-leader pricing involves setting a low base price to attract customers and high-price add-ons. Richard H. 
Holton, Price Discrimination at Retail: The Supermarket Case, 6 J. INDUS. ECON. 28 (1957).   
141 Incidentally, the importance of salience in pricing was understood by both industry participants and the regulatory 
community before behavioral law and economics scholars began contemplating these issues. See, e.g., FTC, Trade 
Regulation Rule; Credit Practices, 49 FED. REG. 7740, 7746 (Mar. 1, 1984): 
Consumers have limited incentives to search out better remedial provisions in credit contracts. The 
substantive similarities of contracts from different creditors mean that a search is less likely to reveal a 
different alternative. Because remedies are relevant only in the event of default, and default is relatively 
infrequent, consumers reasonably concentrate their search on such factors as interest rates and payment terms.  
142 Glenn Ellison, supra note 142.  
143 See id. at 589. 
144 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 61. These are two prominent examples of a long line of papers around this 
time that model markets with sophisticated firms exploiting their customers’ behavioral biases. See also Stefano Della 
Vigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694 (2006); Haiyan Shui & Laurence 
M. Ausubel, Consumer Time Inconsistency: Evidence from a Market Experiment in the Credit Card Market (2004) 
(working paper); Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1031 (2005).  
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losses.145 In later work, Professor Bar-Gill considers the question of when regulatory price caps 
can increase consumer welfare.146 He makes the point that consumers can under- or over-estimate 
what he refers to as “utility” (e.g., the base utility from subscribing to a credit card) and “price” 
(e.g., the per-use price of an overdraft incident) and suggests well-designed regulatory intervention 
can address these behavioral errors.147   
 
III.  LESSONS OF THESE CASE STUDIES 
 
 Like Professor Bar-Gill, my goal is to understand when price regulation will be effective. 
This Article focuses on what he terms “price misperception,” but in the narrower consumer finance 
market.148  The goal of this Article is to intermediate between some in the regulatory community 
who believe price regulations will be universally effective regardless of the market particulars149 
and those who believe any regulatory intervention will be ill-fated.150 By studying the available 
empirical evidence from these three recent case studies, I form a more nuanced view and believe 
the lessons for regulators can be succinctly stated: Shrouding of consumer prices results in 
inefficient overuse of products, inefficient effort expended by the sophisticated to avoid costly 
add-ons, and subsidies of the sophisticated by their less-sophisticated counterparts. Regulation of 
non-salient prices is thus likely to be effective. In imperfectly competitive markets, price 
regulation, or alternatively behaviorally informed “salience shocks,” can also decrease overall 
consumer costs. However, price regulation absent a salience problem is less likely to achieve its 
ends. The differential impact of Durbin and the CARD Act can be explained through this lens of 
salience.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 See Agarwal et al., supra note 2 (on the CARD Act); Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 2 (same). 
146 Oren Bar-Gill, Price Caps in Multiprice Markets, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2015). 
147 See id. at 454–55. 
148 Although I believe it is fair to extend these findings beyond consumer finance, to other markets where 
unsophisticated consumers contract with sophisticated firms. In related work, Professors Tom Baker and Peter 
Siegelman suggest that price-shrouding in the insurance market leads to persistent high profits on insurance products 
like extended warranties on consumer electronics and rental-car insurance. “You Want Insurance with That?” Using 
Behavioral Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-on Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2013) (with Peter 
Siegelman). 
149 See, e.g., Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Peter Welch’s response to calls to repeal Durbin, arguing 
aggressively in favor of regulatory intervention in this market: “Make no mistake—Visa, Mastercard, and the big 
banks want to scare Congress and regulators away from exerting oversight…They think that by discrediting 
Congressional efforts to rein in their rigged schemes in the past, they will enhance their ability to get away with rigged 
schemes in the future.” Dick Durbin & Peter Welch, Sideswiped: The Hidden Motive Behind the Big Bank Push to 
Repeal Swipe Fee Reform, MEDIUM (Sept. 28, 2016), https://medium.com/@SenatorDurbin/sideswiped-the-hidden-
motive-behind-the-big-bank-push-to-repeal-swipe-fee-reform-504b9a097827 (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
150 See, e.g., Professor Todd Zywicki’s sharp critiques of the three regulatory interventions studied in this paper, 
Todd J. Zywicki et al., Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience,  ICLE (2014), 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1418.pdf (criticizing Durbin); Todd Zywicki, 
Overdraft Protection Rules Could Hurt Consumers More Than They Help, MERCATUS CTR. (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/overdraft-protection-rules-could-hurt-consumers-more-they-help (last 
visited on Jun. 11, 2018) (criticizing overdraft reform); Zywicki, supra note 77. 
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A.  Lesson 1: Non-Salient Pricing Is Common in Consumer Finance and Suggests a Role for 
Regulatory Intervention 
 
Salience problems in consumer finance markets result from inattention and irrational 
optimism. These are distinct problems but perhaps both at play in the case studies above. 
Consumers may entirely fail to read lengthy and complicated151 credit card contracts, and so they 
ignore terms discussing penalty fees and interest rate hikes—this is an inattention problem.152 Or, 
some consumers may read these terms, but believe (wrongly) that they will never incur penalties, 
and so similarly fail to factor them into product choice.153  
The price structure for consumer finance products, with low up-front pricing (like low 
teaser rates for credit cards or checking accounts with zero monthly fees) and high long-term 
shrouded pricing (like overdraft/delinquency fees or increases in credit card interest rates) is 
designed to exploit consumer irrationality to generate profits. Behavioral failings suggest a role 
for price regulation to help rein in shrouded prices.  
Even in a world with perfect competition—where banks’ revenue is not 
supracompetitive—regulation of shrouded prices is desirable. This is because often high-cost 
hidden add-ons, like overdraft, are avoided by sophisticated consumers: In 2006, low-income 
customers154 paid twice the overdraft fees of their high-income counterparts.155 Regulating non-
salient prices will eliminate this cross-subsidy. Also, price regulation will decrease use of products 
by consumers who misunderstand their costs and eliminate inefficient behavior to avoid add-on 
prices.  
From a policy perspective, regulators would be well-served to monitor growing sources of 
revenue for large financial institutions that appear to implicate salience concerns. The fact that 
overdraft revenue sky-rocketed after the introduction of automated overdraft services,156 or that 
penalty fees became the fastest growing source of revenue for card issuers,157 hinted at salience 
problems that price regulation was well-suited to address. 
I focus on the desirability of price regulations in markets with shrouded pricing and assume 
that it is obvious when salience problems are at play. While I acknowledge this assumption not 
necessarily realistic, there are many ways we can imagine testing for price-shrouding in consumer 
markets. For example, we can use surveys to ascertain whether consumers correctly perceive their 
likelihood of needing expensive add-on services like overdraft protection.158  
                                                 
151 The typical credit card agreement is written at an 8th- to 9th-grade reading level, which is higher than that of the 
average American. Alyxandra Cash & Hui-Ju Tsai, Readability of the Credit Card Agreements and Financial Charges, 
24 FIN. RES. LETTERS 145, 146 (2018). 
152 Professor Cass Sunstein discusses this exact phenomenon: “[Borrowers] might not read the fine print; they might 
believe that short-term ‘teaser rates’ are actually long-term.” Sunstein, supra note 136, at 251. 
153 As Barr et al., supra note 137, highlight, pre-CARD Act issuers were able to levy penalty fees with “relative 
impunity” because consumers believed they would never bear them.  
154 Median household income of $30,000 or less. FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft supra note 89. 
155 Median household income of $70,000 or more. Id. 
156 Id.  
157 “Late fees have become the fastest growing source of revenue for the industry, jumping from $1.7 billion in 1996 
to $7.3 billion in 2001.” Tamara Draut & Javier Silva, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet, DEMOS (Sept. 2003) 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet_0.pdf. 
158 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 61, propose this and four other empirical strategies to identify the existence of 
shrouding: (1) consumer surveys to determine whether consumers at the point of purchase are aware of add-on costs, 
(2) testing comparative statics associated with a model of muted consumer response to camouflaged pricing schemes, 
(3) determining whether firms increase search costs for add-on prices, (4) conducting product audits to determine if 
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B.  Lesson 1a: Not All Consumer Finance Markets Involve Shrouded Prices. 
 
The existence of price-shrouding makes clear that regulatory intervention is desirable, 
regardless of market specifics. However, the inverse is not true. That is, the absence of non-salient 
pricing does not necessarily suggest that price regulation is undesirable; however, it does suggest 
that intervention will be more complicated, and losses are likely to be offset by profit-maximizing 
firms. The effect of the Durbin Amendment highlights the challenges of price regulation in the 
absence of a salience problem.  
 For many merchants, after labor, interchange fees are among the highest operating costs.159 
These fees—which grew substantially due to greater use of payment cards and the introduction of 
rewards cards with high interchange rates—prompted a series of antitrust lawsuits and merchant 
lobbying for legislative intervention. No price shrouding was at play here.  
Unlike the CARD Act, which capped non-salient aspects of the consumer credit bundle,160 
Durbin instituted a price ceiling on debit interchange below banks’ costs. Banks can (roughly) be 
understood as generating checking account revenue from two sources: consumer account fees and 
merchant interchange fees. Prior to Durbin, most banks did not charge an account fee to consumers 
and used interchange revenue from merchants (through consumer debit purchases) to cover 
checking account costs. Durbin capped interchange fees, so the other aspect of the checking 
account bundle increased to cover costs: Consumers’ account fees more than doubled.161 As a 
result, customers who cannot afford, or refuse to pay, these higher account fees were pushed into 
often-costlier banking alternatives such as payday lending and check-cashing services.162  
The fact that interchange revenue and account servicing costs are bundled together is not 
obvious to one unfamiliar with the organization of banks. To forestall distortionary consequences, 
banks must not be forced to offer products at a price below cost. But what is a product? A payment 
transaction? A checking account? The sum of customers’ relationships with the bank ranging from 
checking accounts to money market accounts to home mortgages? This question demonstrates the 
importance of attention to institutional detail and organization. Given how consumer banking is 
often siloed (for example, into deposits, cards, and consumer real estate divisions), most banks do 
not set prices based on the sum of a consumer’s relationships with the institution. Instead, banks 
appear to optimize by considering all of the revenue generated from a product offering and whether 
                                                 
base goods are being sold at loss-leader prices, and (5) looking for learning effects to see if consumers, when made 
aware of add-on pricing, change their behavior. Id. at 528–29. 
159 See Paul Gackle, The Fight Over Interchange Fees, FRONTLINE (Nov. 24, 2009), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/themes/interchange.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
160 Hidden penalty fees exploded to become the fastest-growing source of revenue for issuers, accounting for 12.5% 
of total card industry profits immediately preceding the CARD Act’s passage. See Tim Ranzetta, How Much Do 
Consumers Pay Annually in Credit Card Late Fees?, NGPF (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ngpf.org/blog/credit-
cards/much-consumers-pay-annually-credit-card-late-fees/. In response to the CARD Act’s restrictions, even those in 
the industry cheered many of the changes as “completely appropriate. Jamie Dimon, Letter to Shareholders (Mar. 26, 
2010), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/2009AR_Letter_to_shareholders.pdf 
(last visited on Jun. 11, 2018); see also id. (“In fact, we had voluntarily eliminated certain of the targeted practices—
like double-cycle billing, which resulted in greater interest charges for customers who revolve a balance for the first 
time (2007); and universal default pricing, in which creditors consider credit histories with other lenders in setting 
rates (2008).”). Penalty fees have fallen by roughly half since the CARD Act was enacted. See Ranzetta, supra. 
161 See, e.g. Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30. 
162 FDIC data suggest that of the approximately 800,000 households that once had bank accounts but are currently 
unbanked, an estimated 10% cite “[b]ank account fees are too high” as the primary reason for their unbanked status. 
FDIC Unbanked Survey 2015, supra note 89.  
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this revenue exceeds the cost of offering that product. This is why industry experts cautioned that 
regulations reducing overdraft and interchange fees (two revenue streams for consumer checking 
accounts) would decrease the availability of free checking.163  
Another added complexity for regulators is that costs are bank-specific. For example, large 
banks can charge higher fees than small banks,164 and have lower funding costs.165 These 
differences suggest significant heterogeneity in individual bank business models that results in the 
same regulation having differentially distortionary consequences. This is evident when studying 
banks’ responses to the new overdraft opt-in regime: Large banks announced the end of the $40 
cup of coffee and moved beyond the requirements of the new opt-in policies.166 In contrast, 
community banks pushed customers toward overdraft protection, achieving opt-in rates of around 
three times the industry average.167  Fee income from deposit accounts was such a significant 
source of revenue for the midsize bank TCF that it challenged the constitutionality of Durbin and 
is being investigated by the CFPB for deceptive opt-in practices.168 Such differences in bank 
business models highlight the desirability of tailored regulatory approaches.   
The fact that price shrouding is not a concern in the interchange market does not mean that  
regulatory intervention cannot be justified. Many who study the credit and debit card market 
believe the interchange fee structure—which charges merchants for consumers’ use of these 
payment products through zero (or, through rewards programs, even negative) per-transaction 
cost—incentivizes excessive card usage.169 Additionally, since this market enforces price 
coherence,170 the result is another cross-subsidy: All consumers pay higher retail prices to cover 
merchant costs for processing the high-cost rewards cards of the wealthiest.171 This is one plausible 
explanation for Durbin: Rather than lower overall consumer costs, the objective may have been to 
shift interchange costs to consumers to disincentivize card use. If so, the fact that banks offset 
                                                 
163 74 FED. REG. at 5903, banking industry comments note that because overdraft subsidizes checking-account 
maintenance costs, any loss of overdraft revenue would harm consumers who currently enjoy these services without 
paying for them. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-11-17/html/E9-27474.htm (last visited on Mar. 15, 2018). 
See also 76 FED. REG. at 43460, with many banks commenting that the response to Durbin would be an increase in 
debit card or other account fees, a decrease in cardholder rewards, and a decrease in the availability of debit cards, 
i.e., with transaction size limits. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-20/html/2011-16860.htm (last visited on 
March 15, 2018). 
164 This may be because they provide access to better services like developed eBanking platforms and more-
extensive branch and ATM networks. Bord, supra note YY.  
165 Large banks’ access to wholesale funding sources decreases reliance on retail deposits, contributing to banks’ 
ability to offer lower retail deposit rates. See, e.g., Kwangwoo Park and George Pennacchi, Harming Depositors and 
Helping Borrowers: The Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation. 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2009). 
166 Andrew Martin, Bank of America to End Debit Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/10overdraft.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 
2018). 
167 Willis, supra note 4.  
168 The CFPB’s complaint states explicitly that “Given TCF’s dependence on overdraft fee revenue, the Opt-In Rule 
posed a serious threat to its business model.” CFPB Complaint, supra note 118.  
169 See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EURO. ECON. 
ASS’N 990 (2003); Julian Wright. The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, 52 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 1 (2004); Özlem Bedre-Defolie, Pricing Payment Cards, 5 AM. ECON. J. 206 (2013); Levitin, supra note 60.   
170 See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S.Ct. 1144 (2017) (holding that a New York statute 
that prevents credit-card surcharges but allows cash discounts requires First Amendment scrutiny because it restricts 
how merchants can communicate prices).  
171 See, for example, Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation, 130 Q. 
J. ECON. 1283 (2015), for a theoretical model of price coherence on consumer welfare. The authors suggest that lifting 
restrictions that enforce price coherence can help increase consumer surplus in these settings.  
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Durbin’s losses through higher fees was an expected outcome rather than an unexpected distortion. 
It is hard to reconcile this rationale with the statements of regulators who said they anticipated 
(and believe there was) a decrease in overall consumer costs and no bank offset to Durbin.172 
Additionally, it is particularly unclear why Durbin targeted debit card rather than credit card fees 
(or fees for both payment types) if reining in socially non-optimal excessive card usage was its 
goal.173 Debit cards are a desirable alternative to credit because they decouple transacting from the 
provision of financial services through consumer credit loans: There is no concern with debit cards 
that overuse will increase consumer indebtedness.174  Perversely, because of Durbin, banks stopped 
innovating their safer debit products and pushed consumers toward greater use of credit cards.  
  
C.  Lesson 2: The Banking Industry Is Not Perfectly Competitive  
 
The combination of shrouded prices and imperfectly competitive markets paves the way 
for price regulation to decrease overall consumer costs. Both elements were present in the credit 
card market, which is why the CARD Act lowered overall consumer borrowing costs by an 
estimated $12 billion annually.175  
In an imperfectly competitive market, firms with market power whose non-salient prices 
are capped weigh the benefits of increasing salient prices for all customers against the costs of 
decreasing demand for their product. Because they do not have to raise prices to get back to zero 
profits (as with perfect competition), they may not fully offset losses. Academics who have studied 
the CARD Act develop theoretical models to illustrate this point,176 but relatively little work has 
been done to understand the origin of market power in imperfectly competitive consumer finance 
markets. Understanding why these markets deviate from the perfectly competitive ideal can help 
policymakers craft regulation to best address the market failure at hand.  
To be clear, the case studies discussed involve two distinct but closely related industries: 
(1) credit card networks (like Visa and Mastercard) that set interchange rates on their payment 
instruments and intermediate between issuing banks that distribute their cards, consumers who use 
them, and merchants who accept them; and (2) card-issuing banks (like Bank of America and 
Cambridge Savings Bank) that set contract terms on the credit cards they issue and the checking 
accounts they provide.177  
                                                 
172 See, for example, Dick Durbin, Correcting the Record About the Durbin Amendment, MEDIUM (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@SenatorDurbin/correcting-the-record-about-the-durbin-amendment-94e913f014f1 (last visited 
on Jun. 11, 2018), in which Senator Durbin suggests that claims that banks decreased the availability of free checking 
in response to the Durbin Amendment are a “myth,” and that retailer savings have been passed through to consumers.  
173 Unlike predecessor legislation in Australia, which capped credit interchange with the specific goal of reducing 
credit usage. See Chang et al., supra note 18.    
174 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004) (suggesting that unbundling transacting and 
financial services would help decrease consumer indebtedness; even absent legal intervention, the market took its first 
step in this direction with the advent of the debit card).  
175 Agarwal et al., supra note 2.  
176 See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 2, and Agarwal et al., supra note 2, as the most prominent examples.  
177 Lawrence Ausubel focuses on this distinction in his early study on imperfect competition in the credit card 
industry: “If Visa and Mastercard were the relevant levels of business to examine, then two firms would control a 
substantial part of the credit card market. However, most relevant business decisions are made at the level of the 
issuing bank. Individual banks own their cardholders’ accounts and determine the interest rate, annual fee, grace 
period, credit limit, and other terms of the accounts. Only charges such as the ‘interchange fee’ from the merchant’s 
bank to the cardholder’s bank are standardized . . .” Laurence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit 
Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50 (1991). 
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From all appearances, the card network industry is much closer to oligopoly than perfect 
competition. Market share is highly concentrated: Visa and Mastercard together account for nearly 
80% of the global debit market and 75% of the credit card market. These issuers historically 
erected barriers to entry to impede competitors. For example, exclusivity agreements prohibited 
banks from issuing credit or other charge cards for other networks, like American Express and 
Discover. Before these agreements were deemed to be unlawful restraints on competition, they 
were highly successful. Between 1996 (when American Express first offered its cards to bank 
issuers) and the United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.178 decision in 2001, no banks concluded deals 
with American Express because of concerns about losing Visa and Mastercard as card providers.179 
Even today, only a handful of bank issuers offer American Express and Discover cards, and few 
other card competitors exist. On the merchant side, Visa and Mastercard exploit their market power 
by crafting contract terms like “Honor All Cards” and prohibiting merchants from steering 
consumers toward cheaper payment types.180  
Some commentators point to the banking industry as similarly oligopolistic. Forty percent 
of U.S. deposits are concentrated in five banks: Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
Citibank, and U.S. Bancorp. This big-bank share has more than quadrupled since 1990.181  Calls to 
break up the banks following the Recession relate to a view that these firms are oligopolies with a 
government backstop that results in high consumer prices and excessive risk-taking. Progressives 
like Senator Elizabeth Warren point to banking as an example of how “in every corner of our 
economy, big, powerful corporations are killing off competition.”182   
But, unlike credit card networks, the banking industry has neither contractually-implied 
barriers to entry nor a near-constant stream of antitrust cases alleging collusive pricing practices. 
Professor Oren Bar-Gill distinguishes these two markets: “While competition at the network level 
might be less than perfect, it is difficult to deny the intensity of competition at the issuing level, 
where thousands of banks, as well as American Express and Discover, compete for customers.”183  
The fact that the card-issuing banks are less oligopolistic than card networks does not mean 
banking is perfectly competitive. However, it suggests that market failures in this industry are not 
a by-product of too-big-to-fail firms erecting impediments to competition to concentrate their 
market power. Instead, in the card-issuing market, deviations from competitive pricing arise from 
customer loyalty: Once you have a Bank of America checking account, you’re unlikely to leave to 
join Cambridge Savings Bank, even if Cambridge Savings Bank offers you a lower price. Banks 
exploit this stickiness by charging fees and imposing interest rates that earn them positive profits. 
Customer stickiness has two sources: ex-ante and ex-post product differentiation. Ex-ante, 
bank products are different: Bank of America’s checking account comes with a set of amenities 
(like ATMs conveniently located nationally and a mobile app for check deposits) that are distinct 
from those at Cambridge Savings Bank (like personal relationships with the bank’s staff) that make 
the cost of the account but one part of a consumer’s decision-making process. If the cost of 
switching banks and the value to the consumer of her home bank’s slightly differentiated product 
                                                 
178 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 340–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 811 
(2004). 
179 Id. 
180 Professor Adam Levitin discusses these rules—which prohibit merchants from steering customers to cheaper 
payment system—as causes of imperfect competition in the credit card industry that harm consumers. Levitin, supra 
note 60. 
181 See Bank Call Reports.  
182 Senator Elizabeth Warren, Speech to Open Markets (Dec. 6, 2018).  
183 See Bar-Gill, supra note 54, at 16.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224172 
 
34 
 
are higher than the mark-up of the bank over marginal cost, she will bear the higher price rather 
than take her business to a cheaper competitor. However, ex-ante product differentiation alone will 
not sustain large profits, because there is an incentive for a national bank competitor to enter and 
offer Bank of America’s amenities, or a local bank to enter that parallels Cambridge Savings Bank 
almost exactly but has a lower price. This is a market with differentiated products and monopolistic 
competition rather than a monopoly with supracompetitive long-term profits.  
However, gains from product differentiation will not necessarily be competed away due to 
switching costs that discourage customers from taking their business to lower-price competitors.184 
One example is a search cost—that is, the physical cost of performing research on neighboring 
banks to locate cheaper checking account alternatives. Another is a transaction cost, such as the 
time cost associated with closing an account once a cheaper alternative is identified, a cost firms 
consciously try to keep high.185 Another switching cost is a learning cost: Once a consumer knows 
how to check her account balance, or inform her bank that she’ll be traveling, learning a whole 
new set of such practices may be daunting. Additionally, the existence of customer loyalty 
programs, like extra rewards points for being a long-term client, are contractual switching costs 
that entrench customers. Yet another cost arises from brand loyalty: A customer who has banked 
with Cambridge Savings Bank her whole life may prefer it to East Cambridge Savings Bank with 
an identical product because the mortgage officer helped her parents refinance their house, and 
because the teller never forgets her birthday. Even if products are ex-ante identical, ex-post 
switching costs make it unlikely that customers will sever banking relationships. This is 
empirically true: estimates suggest that only 3% of checking account holders move banks annually, 
and nearly 60% have been with their provider for more than a decade.186 
Ex-post product differentiation can and does sustain long-run positive profits because once 
customers are locked into their banking relationship, banks can exploit them—for example, by 
levelling high fees. Stickiness becomes a source of market power for large financial institutions. 
Incidentally, one plausible explanation for different degrees of market power in the deposits and 
the consumer credit market is that stickiness varies for these two products. Solicitations for new 
credit cards are extremely common—in the pre-crisis period, credit card issuers averaged 6.7 
million pieces of mail per year;187 yet, new checking account offers are much less frequent. Still, 
there is evidence of stickiness in both markets, which increases financial institutions’ profitability: 
                                                 
184 The switching-cost model is outlined theoretically by Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching 
Costs, 102 Q. J. ECON. 375 (1987), and its implications for the credit card market are discussed by Ausubel, supra 
note 177; as well as Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit Card 
Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327 (1991); and Victor Stango, Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: 
Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 475 (2002); among others.  
185 See, e.g., Connie Prater, For Some, Switching Credit Cards Gets Harder, CREDIT CARD NEWS (Feb. 19, 2009), 
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/switching-credit-cards-gets-harder-1267.php (last visited on Jun. 11, 
2018). In this article, Professor Levitin discusses how, for many credit card users, “[w]alking away is costly.”  
186 Emma Dunkley, CMA Told to Drop Efforts to Make Customers Switch Banks, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/70741fc6-2ca8-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018).  
187 These volumes have fallen post-crisis, to closer to 4 million. Bob Bryan, Credit Card Companies Have Sent Out 
3.2 Billion Pieces of Mail This Year, and That’s Not Even Close to the Record, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 24 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-card-companies-32-billion-pieces-of-mail-this-year-2015-11 (last visited on 
Jun. 20, 2018). 
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Consumers tend not to switch credit cards when attractive introductory rates expire,188 and banks 
feel little pressure to pass down increases in interest rates189 to their sticky deposit customers.190    
Why does the nature of market imperfection matter? It is true that, in the presence of 
shrouded prices, no matter the cause of the market imperfection, price regulation—like the CARD 
Act or changes to the overdraft default rules—can decrease overall consumer costs. But market 
dynamics provide useful insights for regulators beyond the attractiveness of regulating hidden 
prices: While monopoly markets may necessitate stricter antitrust enforcement, markets that are 
imperfectly competitive due to switching costs can be brought closer to perfect competition by 
lowering these costs. Although ex-ante product differentiation is societally beneficial because it 
increases the choices available to consumers (for example, offering different products for 
consumers who care about national ATM networks and those who do not),191 differentiating 
functionally identical products through switching costs has no similar benefits.  
Thus, practical measures—like requiring banks to simplify account closure—may help 
move the market closer to perfect competition, thus curbing excessive bank profits. Similarly, 
regulators should consider limiting customer loyalty programs and standardizing product types 
between institutions to decrease the learning hurdle for potential switchers. In a world with lower 
switching costs, it is plausible that some banks—specifically, those that did not rely on lost 
interchange revenue to cover their costs—would have been more reluctant to raise checking 
account fees post-Durbin. If customers are fluid, these banks would have to weigh benefits from 
higher prices against costs from lower demand. If instead customers are sticky, there is room for 
banks to adjust price without losing customers.  
There is an added benefit to reining in switching costs. Like regulations that decrease price-
shrouding, interventions that lower switching costs will disincentivize inefficient consumer 
behavior. For example, imagine your friend Penny is highly cost-sensitive. If there is a penny to 
be saved by closing her current checking account and switching to another bank, she will expend 
tremendous effort to locate the slightly cheaper bank, close her current account, and open another. 
Although this is an extreme example, variants are not far from reality—many consumers are 
                                                 
188 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? REV. CORP. FIN. STUDIES (2015), 
who provide large-scale experimental evidence that around 40% of consumers choose sub-optimal credit contracts.  
189 On bank deposits, see David Neumark & Steven A. Sharpe, Market Structure and the Nature of Price Rigidity: 
Evidence from the Market for Consumer Deposits, 107 Q.J. ECON. 657 (1992) (showing banks are slow to raise interest 
rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates; but fast to reduce deposit rates in response to declining 
market interest rates); John C. Driscoll & Ruth A. Judson, Sticky Deposit Rates, FED. RESERVE BD. (2013) (working 
paper) (suggesting that in the absence of such stickiness, depositors would have received as much as $100 billion more 
in interest per year when market rates were rising); Maria Lamagna, Banks Have Raised Credit-Card Interest Rates—
But Not Savings Account Rates, FORBES (Jul. 23, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/banks-have-raised-
credit-card-interest-rates-but-not-savings-account-rates-2017-07-20 (last visited Jun. 20, 2018) (pointing out that 
recent increases in interest rates have increased the cost of credit but not been passed through to depositors).  
190 There is also evidence of significant stickiness in other consumer finance markets; for example, borrowers fail 
to refinance expensive home mortgages. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1579-85 
(2006) (documenting that 25% of borrowers pay more than 200 basis points above the prevailing market rate, and that 
these refinancing mistakes are concentrated in less-educated, lower income, and minority borrowers); Alex Yoon-Ho 
Lee & K. Jeremy Ko, Consumer Mistakes in the Mortgage Market: Choosing Unwisely Versus Not Switching Wisely, 
14 U. PA. BUS. L. J. 417 (2012) (suggesting that failure-to-switch problems are unlikely to be corrected by the market 
and arguing for a salience-shock-style approach to convey the wealth effects of refinancing).  
191 Although the psychology literature counters that cognitive limitations—like information overload from too many 
choices and cognitive strain from evaluating varied options—mean that policymakers seeking to help consumers 
“should avoid adding options without considering their content and quality” Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The 
Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24 (2006).  
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“point-chasing fanatics,” maintaining several credit cards and expending both mental energy and 
time to determine which card to use for groceries, which offers the highest cash-back rewards, and 
when to close accounts before teaser offers expire. Some even take so-called “mileage runs,” that 
is, traveling by air for the sole purpose of earning frequent flier miles.192 Finding the best deal is 
likely utility-enhancing for these individuals; however, it is hard to see why this intensity of search 
as socially desirable.193  
 
D.  Lesson 3: Non-Salient Cost Shocks May Not Be Fully Passed Through to Consumers 
 
In advocating for the Durbin Amendment, Senator Dick Durbin argued that these cost 
savings to merchants would “lead to lower consumer prices at grocery stores, convenience stores, 
and other retailers that, unlike Visa and MasterCard, have to vigorously compete with one another 
on price.”194  
A host of empirical evidence suggests that such savings have not come to pass. Although 
Durbin decreased merchant costs by an estimated $6.5 billion annually, academics studying 
Durbin’s retail price impacts have found little evidence of a pass-through of interchange savings.195 
If increasing consumer welfare was the goal, a regulatory intervention that directly increased 
consumer wealth instead of relying on merchant pass-through would have been preferable.  
The failure of retail prices to decrease in response to interchange cost savings parallels the 
impact of interchange regulation in Australia.196 Conceptually, the lack of a full price pass through 
is surprising—as Representative Peter Welch noted, these are fairly competitive industries: “you 
have one gas station on a corner and there are three competitors, most of us when we are filling up 
with gas, go to the one that is a penny or two cheaper. And is there any reason to think that wouldn’t 
happen[?]”197 
Incidentally, interchange is not the only case in which merchants appear slow to pass 
through cost savings to their customers and the gas industry in particular provides a helpful case 
study for when Welch’s simple economic intuition can break down. While increases in wholesale 
prices are quickly passed through, it takes much longer for decreases in wholesale prices to result 
in lower retail gas prices. This is often referred to as the “rockets and feathers effect.”198 
                                                 
192 There are even conferences for point-chasers. Chavie Lieber, The Credit Card Obsessives Who Game the 
System—And Share Secrets Online, RACKED (Apr, 1, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.racked.com/2015/4/1/8320731/credit-card-points-miles (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). (quoting Angelina 
Acullo, a conference attendee and then stay-at-home mother who took 90 international flights on points in 2014).  
193 Id. (noting that “a large part of the community doesn’t actually like to travel, but they love gaming the system. 
It’s like extreme couponing: Those people get, like, 10,000 diapers for free even though they don’t have kids. In this 
case, some people care about screwing the airline.”). 
194 156 Cong. Rec. S4839 (daily ed. June 10, 2010).  
195 See, e.g., Wang et al., supra note 36 (discussing how merchants that saved did not change prices meaningfully 
and how small-ticket merchants whose interchange fees rose following Durbin’s enactment increased prices). See also 
Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30 (estimating that Durbin saved gas stations on the order of $.006 cents per 
gallon and ruling out a price impact of even 25% that size). 
196 Testimony of Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin, supra note 47 (noting that the Australian credit interchange cap 
had an “inconclusive” impact on retail prices) https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-8.pdf 
197 Id.  
198 See Nick Collins, Fuel Prices: The ‘Rocket and Feather Effect’ Explained, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2014, 12:49 
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/11212890/Fuel-prices-the-rocket-and-
feather-effect-explained.html (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018); Michael T. Owyang & E. Katarina Vermann, Rockets 
and Feathers: Why Don’t Gasoline Prices Always Move in Sync with Oil Prices? REGIONAL ECONOMIST (Oct. 2014), 
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Economists Severin Borenstein, Colin Cameron, and Richard Gilbert find that a one-cent increase 
in crude oil prices is almost fully incorporated into retail prices within two weeks, whereas a one-
cent decrease results in a barely 0.2-cent decrease over this same horizon.199 While this is an oft-
revisited question in the economics literature,200 a review of the available evidence indicates an 
asymmetric response to price hikes and decreases. Evidence of this asymmetry exists more 
broadly. In a seminal article, economist Sam Peltzman studied a large sample of diverse products 
spanning 77 consumer and 165 producer goods and found evidence that output prices respond 
faster to input increases than decreases in two-thirds of the markets examined.201 On average, he 
concludes that the response to a positive price shock is at least twice the response to a negative 
shock, and this difference is sustained for at least five to eight months.202 Especially relevant to 
this study of consumer finance, banks respond to increases in the federal funds rate by raising 
interest rates for borrowers but not for depositors.203 So, even in the same market, and sometimes 
to the same consumer, banks charge higher prices to consumers who borrow from them when 
interest rates rise, but fail to pay more to consumers from whom they borrow.   
There are two common explanations in the economics literature to explain asymmetric 
price adjustment in retail gas that seem plausibly related to merchants’ responses to the Durbin 
Amendment.204 The first relies on gas stations being oligopolists. Although a significant positive 
cost shock triggers retail price increases (otherwise, margins become negative), negative cost 
shocks need not be immediately passed through. Prevailing prices (prior to the shock) are a 
coordination mechanism for oligopolists that allows for the market price to exceed marginal cost, 
at least temporarily. The possibility of oligopolistic pricing is bolstered by evidence that 
asymmetries are largest—and persist longest—for gas stations with market power, because they 
are either isolated from competitors or have brand loyalty from customers.205  
The second explanation relates to the impact of wholesale cost shocks on incentives for 
consumer search. One version relies on volatility in the crude oil market: The average consumer 
assumes changes in retail gas prices are a by-product of volatile wholesale prices. Thus, they 
                                                 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2014/d/oil_prices.pdf (last visited on 
Jun. 11, 2018).  
199 Severin Borenstein et al., Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Oil Price Changes? 112 Q. J. ECON. 
305 (1997). 
200 There is not a broad consensus on the existence or magnitude of this asymmetry. See, e.g., Michael C. Davis & 
James D. Hamilton, Why Are Prices Sticky? The Dynamics of Wholesale Gasoline Prices, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & 
BANKING 17 (2004); Matthew S. Lewis, Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Examination of the 
Retail Gasoline Market, 20 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 409 (2011); Jeremy A. Verlinda, Do Rockets Rise Faster 
and Feathers Fall Slower in an Atmosphere of Local Market Power? Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Market, 56 
J. INDUS. ECON. 581 (2008); among many others.  
201 Sam Peltzman, Prices Rise Faster than They Fall, 108 J. POL. ECON. 466 (2000).  
202 Id.  
203 See Annalyn Kurtz, Rising Interest Rates Aren’t Going to Do Much for Your Savings Account, FORTUNE (Mar. 
9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/federal-reserves-saving-accounts-rates/ (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018); 
George Deltas, Retail Gasoline Price Dynamics and Local Market Power, 56 J. INDUS. ECON. 613 (2008) (comparing 
asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry to the banking industry, where deposits and loans exhibit price 
stickiness and asymmetric responses to the cost of funds).  
204 Although the most common, these are not the only explanations for asymmetric price pass-through. For detailed 
discussion, see Borenstein et al., supra note 199.  
205 See, e.g., Verlinda, supra note 207. (finding market power decreases the propensity to pass through savings and 
that branded stations—Chevron, Shell, and Texaco—exhibit greater asymmetry than unbranded stations).  
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believe gains from search are small.206 Gas retailers realize that, at least temporarily, consumers 
have little incentive to search for a cheaper alternative and, therefore, fail to pass through wholesale 
cost savings. Another version, the “reference cost model,”207 instead suggests that retailers adjust 
prices only as needed to keep price above marginal cost. A positive cost shock requires full pass-
through; however, in response to a negative cost shock, retailers lower price just enough to forestall 
search. In either case, because no one is searching in response to a negative cost shock, competitors 
are unable to attract customers by lowering their prices. It is worth noting that if low consumer 
search is responsible for the failure of merchants to pass through Durbin savings, policymakers 
can help encourage greater pass-through by making these savings more salient to retail 
customers.208  
There are several important caveats to this lesson. First, as the gas literature makes clear, 
negative cost shocks are eventually passed through to consumers—although this price adjustment 
can take months. So, the fact that economists who study retail price adjustments to Durbin209 fail 
to observe lower prices may be related to the fact that these studies do not consider long-term price 
adjustment. It would be useful to understand whether retail margins have increased post-Durbin. 
Incidentally, given retailers’ extensive Durbin lobbying,210 it seems likely that they believed its 
passage would result in profits. Such merchant gains are consistent with direct statements by 
retailers211 as well as by equity price reactions to Durbin.212 
Whether or not these savings are a long-run gain for retailers, however, available empirical 
evidence suggests that consumers lost immediately on the bank side (with higher fees) and failed 
to gain immediately on the merchant side (with lower prices). As such, the Durbin case study 
cautions against indirect price regulation, like targeting merchants’ interchange fees and trusting 
that these savings will quickly pass through to consumers. More direct price regulation—like caps 
on non-salient prices in the CARD Act or decreasing the likelihood that consumers incur overdraft 
fees—are most likely to increase welfare and decrease costs.  
Although Durbin was repeatedly lauded as a regulatory intervention to benefit 
consumers,213 an alternative justification is that it tilted the balance in the interchange bargaining 
relationship away from oligopolistic card networks in favor of merchants, and particularly small 
businesses without the market power to negotiate attractive side-deals with Visa and MasterCard 
for lower interchange rates.  
                                                 
206 See, for example, Roland Bénabou & Robert Gertner, Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased 
Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups? 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 69 (1993), who formalize this theory, and 
Borenstein et al., supra note 199, who apply it to the retail gas industry.  
207 Matthew Lewis, Asymmetric Price Adjustment and consumer search: An examination of the retail gasoline market. 
J. OF ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY (2011).  
208 The Electronic Payments Coalition sought to do exactly this: In response to Durbin, they launched a “Where Is 
My Debit Discount” campaign, which sought to estimate, for example, the magnitude of savings in the gasoline 
industry (more than $1 billion). See Congress Gave Gas Retailers $1 Billion Annual Subsidy, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS 
COALITION, http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/gasprices/#gaschart (last visited May 3, 2018). 
209 See, e.g., Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30; Wang et al., supra note 36. 
210 Durbin was so contentious that it precipitated more unique comments than any other rule issued by the Federal 
Reserve under Dodd-Frank. Brian Libgober & Daniel Carpenter, Lobbying with Lawyers: Financial Market Evidence 
for Banks’ Influence on Rule-Making, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH Working Paper (Jan. 2018).  
211 Supra note 37 (Home Depot earnings report speculated gains from Durbin totaling $35M).  
212 Sarin & Mukharlyamov, supra note 30.  
213 See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, DICK DURBIN, UNITED 
STATES SENATOR, ILLINOIS (May 13, 2010), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-
statement-on-his-debit-card-swipe-fee-amendment.  
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Historically, merchants relied on antitrust enforcement, not regulatory price caps, to limit 
card networks’ power. For example, litigation challenging “Honor all Cards” rules resulted in a $3 
billion settlement and the forced decoupling of Visa and Mastercard credit and debit card 
acceptance;214 and a recent class action suit alleging collusive pricing practices was settled but 
then invalidated, largely because it restricted merchants’ future ability to bring such suits.215  
Recent trends in antitrust—directly related to interchange—question the viability of 
continued reliance on judicial enforcement in this setting. In Ohio v. American Express, believed 
by some to be the “most significant antitrust decision in a decade,”216 the Supreme Court held that 
since interchange implicates a two-sided market, courts must include both sides of the platform—
merchants and cardholders—when defining the market and assessing whether competition is 
impeded. This approach differs from that recently advocated by Michael Katz and Jonathan Sallet 
in the Yale Law Journal who suggest a “multiple-markets approach” to cases involving multisided 
platforms, such that these are viewed as involving different, yet deeply interrelated markets that 
both may (independently) implicate antitrust concerns.217  
In Ohio v. American Express,218 the Court adopts the “single-markets” approach disfavored 
by Katz and Sallet, holding that although merchants suffer harm (higher fees) from American 
Express contract terms that prohibit them from steering consumers toward cheaper payment 
instruments, on the other side of the market consumers may benefit (through rebates or rewards 
such as airline miles) and thus merchant harm is not sufficient to demonstrate that steering 
prohibitions are anti-competitive.219 With far-ranging implications for several platforms,220 in the 
context of card networks the decision clearly signals a shift—“credit card networks are different” 
and the standards for antitrust violations thus heightened.221 Concerns about the ability of antitrust 
                                                 
214 Although “Honor all Cards” lawsuits for debit versus credit cards resulted in settlement, merchant suits to 
decouple rewards credit acceptance from non-premium credit card acceptance remain live and a new set of litigation 
is likely to emerge around “Honor all Devices” terms, whereby merchants that accept payment instruments housed in 
one digital wallet have to accept all digital wallets, regardless of the costs associated. Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital 
Box: Digital Wallets and the Honor All Devices Rule, CREDIT SLIPS (May 31, 2016), 
http://www.creditslips.org/files/pandoras-digital-box.pdf.  
215 AnnaMaria Andriotis, Visa, Mastercard Near Settlement Over Card-Swipe Fees, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-mastercard-near-settlement-over-card-swipe-fees-1530193694. 
216 Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law, VOX (Jul. 3, 2018 9:40 AM) 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/3/17530320/antitrust-american-express-amazon-uber-tech-monopoly-
monopsony 
217 Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2144 
(2018).  
218 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). 
219 Id. at 365.  
220 “Consider: Under the logic the appeals court used, an anticompetitive scheme by Uber to suppress driver income 
would not be considered illegal unless those bringing the suit showed that riders were also harmed.” Khan, supra note 
223.  
221 In fact, the ruling appears to have pushed merchants toward another settlement with Visa and Mastercard in the 
decades-old price-fixing litigation. One industry commentator suggested that “The Supreme Court AmEx ruling 
probably dissuaded [merchants] from the notion that they had more leverage.” Emily Bary, How Visa and Mastercard 
Could Benefit from a Settlement Over Card-Swipe Fees, MARKETWATCH (Jul. 1, 2018 10:23 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-visa-and-mastercard-could-benefit-from-a-settlement-over-card-swipe-
fees-2018-06-29 
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law to adequately address the increased concentration of corporate power throughout the economy 
have pushed many to argue for a legislative overhaul of antitrust.222 
Although not the focus of this Article, emerging judicial barriers to the use of antitrust 
enforcement to intermediate the merchant/card network relationship may push in favor of 
regulating interchange fees directly, even absent salience problems. However, while such 
regulation—like Durbin’s cap on debit interchange—can help limit card networks’ and issuers’ 
power and supracompetitive profits, it is a mistake to ignore the possible unintended consequences 
on consumers, for example through the increase in bank fees to recoup these losses.  
 
E.  Lesson 4: Salience-Increasing Regulations and Behaviorial Approaches Will Likely Curb 
Abusive Practices  
 
Given that at least some consumers fail to incorporate non-salient prices into their product 
choice, price regulations are socially desirable. But this is not the only regulatory option—making 
non-salient prices salient to consumers is a useful alternative.   
Banks’ initial response to Durbin illustrates the impact of making fees salient on both 
consumer and firm behavior. In the immediate aftermath of Durbin, many large banks proposed a 
$5 monthly fee for customers who use their debit cards as a form of purchase. This fee became a 
rallying cry for the Occupy Wall Street movement—protesters burned Bank of America debit 
cards223 and an online petition against the fee garnered more than 200,000 signatures.224 
Lawmakers scorned the proposal, with then-Vice President Joe Biden labelling it as “incredibly 
tone deaf”225 and Senator Durbin urging consumers to “vote with their feet” and close accounts at 
these institutions.226 Normally inattentive depositors heeded the call: Bank of America CEO Brian 
Moynihan reported that the number of people closing accounts in the immediate aftermath of the 
proposal jumped by more than 20% compared to the same period the prior year.227 The proposed 
$5 fee became so unpopular that all of the institutions chose to reverse it. Bank of America’s COO 
said the bank “listened to our customers very closely” and decided against moving forward with 
plans to charge the fee.228 While banks increased other fees in response to Durbin, the lesson of 
                                                 
222 See, e.g. Dave Jamieson, Democrats Are Finally Waking Up to the Monopoly Problem, HUFFPOST (Jul. 24, 
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-antitrust_us  5976572fe4b0a8a40e817612. “”In fact, several 
members of Congress already have proposed anti-monopoly legislation in the past year, including United States 
Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Representatives David 
Cicilline (D-RI), Keith Ellison (D-MN), and Seth Moulton (D-MA). Khan, supra note 216. 
223 See Bernard, supra note 27. 
224 Ann Carrns, Petition on Debit Card Fee Attracts 200,000 Supporters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), 
https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/petition-on-debit-card-fee-attracts-200000-supporters/ (last visited on 
Jun. 11, 2018). 
225 Amanda Terkel, Joe Biden on Bank of America: At a Minimum, They Are Incredibly Tone Deaf, HUFFPOST (Oct. 
6, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/06/joe-biden-bank-america-tone-deaf_n_998055.html (last 
visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
226 Dick Durbin, Press Release, Bank of America’s Outrageous New Fees, DICK DURBIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, 
ILLINOIS (Oct. 3, 2011) https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/bank-of-americas-outrageous-new-
fees (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
227 Martha C. White, Bank of America’s $5 Debit Fee Led to More Account Closings, CEO Says, TIME (Jan. 23, 
2012), http://business.time.com/2012/01/23/bank-of-americas-5-debit-fee-led-to-more-account-closings-ceo-says/ 
(last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
228 Bernard, supra note 27.  
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the failed $5 debit charge is clear: Raising the salience of a price can incentivize consumers to 
make more informed product choices.  
The potential of such an approach is evident in the overdraft domain. Changing the policy 
default to consumer opt-in for overdraft protection decreased the share of customers capable of 
incurring overdraft fees by more than 80%. Still, many observers229 point to higher opt-in rates for 
frequent overdrafters230 as evidence that this behavioral nudge is not sufficient. These authors 
contend that frequent overdrafters are targeted for opt-in because they are unsophisticated and easy 
targets for revenue generation.231 Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes argue that bank 
overdraft is a case where behavioral economics “trims its sails” by limiting itself to “choice-
preserving regulatory tools” that can generate “incomplete or counterproductive policy 
implications” by enabling firms to continue to exploit consumers’ cognitive limitations.232  
An alternative proposed by critics is a mandate banning overdraft protection, which would 
prohibit banks’ provision of this costly product to irrational consumers. But such mandates 
decrease the set of options available to consumers, some of whom may prefer the convenience of 
overdraft protection despite its high costs.233 Rather than abandon a behavioral nudge in favor of 
a prohibitive mandate, in the case of overdraft, there is room for a “salience shock” that preserves 
consumer choice.  
Making consumers aware of overdraft fees before they are incurred—for example, through 
surveys—discourages overdraft incidence.234 It is possible to imagine a shock that is stronger than 
survey questions. Forcing all banks to offer a version of the new Bank of America ATM overdraft 
protection—such that when a customer attempts a withdrawal, if she is about to overdraft, the bank 
informs her of the fee and provides her the opportunity to cancel the withdrawal—will make these 
fees salient immediately before an overdraft occurs and allow consumers to weigh the benefits of 
completing the transaction against the high costs.  
The same is easily possible for point-of-sale transactions. If a consumer is buying a coffee 
and is about to overdraft, she could receive an alert indicating that if she completes the purchase, 
she will be charged a fee. The alert could also include a reminder that she can set up a less-
expensive overdraft line of credit through her bank that will still allow her to complete the 
transaction. If the consumer is eager for caffeine, has no other means of payment, and values her 
time such that she wants to avoid engaging with her bank, she may elect to complete the 
transaction. But making the fee salient will decrease overdraft incidence for the nearly 70% of 
overdrafters who claim they would have preferred their transactions be declined to high overdraft 
fees.235  
It is important to distinguish this call for a “salience shock” in the context of overdraft from 
mandatory disclosures. Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider provide a scathing 
                                                 
229 See, e.g., Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5; Willis, supra note 4.  
230 Forty-five percent of accounts that had more than 10 non-sufficient funds (NSF) items during the first six months 
of 2010 opted in by the end of 2010, in contrast to only 11% of accounts with no NSF incident. CFPB Study of 
Overdraft Programs, supra note 88.   
231 Issue Brief: Consumers Need Protection from Excessive Overdraft Costs, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 20, 
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/12/consumers-need-protection-from-
excessive-overdraft-costs (last visited on Jun. 11, 2018). 
232 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5. 
233 Sunstein, supra note 136 (highlighting this possibility in response to Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5). 
234 Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the 
Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees, 27 REV. FIN.  STUD. 990 (2014). 
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indictment of mandatory disclosures, suggesting consumers suffer from two main problems that 
render disclosures ineffective: (1) an overload effect (because disclosures are too complex to be 
understood) and (2) an accumulation problem (because it is hard to remember a disclosure when 
it competes in your memory with information about all other disclosures—“memory is a 
sieve.”).236 Professors Michael Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir are also skeptical of 
the usefulness of disclosures, because they note that one way financial institutions generate rents 
from penalty fees is by exploiting consumers’ tendency to underestimate the likelihood they will 
make a late payment or overdraft.237 Therefore, overly optimistic consumers may opt in to 
overdraft protection (even if the high fees are clearly disclosed) because, although they believe it 
is unlikely they will ever use service, they want protection in case of emergency. 
A behavioral “salience shock” like alerting consumers to the cost of an overdraft fee 
immediately before an overdraft incident has the potential to be successful because it avoids the 
overload and accumulation problems. This immediate alert is a very simple disclosure (closer in 
spirit to sanitation grades outside restaurants that Ben-Shahar and Schneider approve of than 
complicated credit card contracts) that does not need to be recalled: The information is presented 
to a consumer the moment prior to decision-making. As such, it also addresses the Barr, 
Mullainathan, and Shafir concern because it makes the cost of overdraft salient when the overdraft 
incident is imminent, not long before when consumers optimistically believe they will never make 
use of this service. Thus, a salience shock is likely to be more effective in reducing costly 
overdrafts than recent proposed changes to opt-in disclosure forms.238  
In proposing this salience shock, I follow the Ben-Shahar and Schneider suggestion that 
“brief, simple, and easy” disclosures work best when they are part of a “larger program of social 
change. Sometimes, the purpose of mandates is not to give people information for making the 
choice they prefer but rather to induce them to make the choice the lawmaker deems preferable.”239 
This shock is meant to do precisely that—strongly nudge consumers away from the $40 coffee but 
preserve their choice to reject the nudge.  
One reason to be confident about the efficacy of a salience shock in the overdraft market 
is that it is already proven to work in practice. The UK Financial Conduct Authority found that 
customers who receive text alerts when their checking account balances fall close to zero reduce 
                                                 
236 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosures, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
237 See Michael S. Barr, et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
REGULATION (D. Moss and J. Cisternino eds. 2009). 
238 See Know Before You Owe: Current Model Form A-9, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_A-9-form-ficus_overdraft-model-forms-prototypes.pdf 
(last visited on Mar. 15, 2018). Professors Bubb and Pildes provide a vivid analogy for why they believe mandated 
disclosures to be ineffective: “Given the structure of the self-control problem, solving it requires forcing or enticing 
the consumer not to engage in a transaction that, even with a clear-eyed understanding of the terms and risks, the 
consumer in that moment wants to make. But while Odysseus could have himself forcibly lashed to the mast, no easy 
way exists for consumers to commit themselves not to open that store line of credit promising no payments and no 
interest for the next twelve months. After all, Odysseus did not instruct his sailors to provide him with a ‘Total Cost 
of Swimming with the Sirens’ disclosure as soon as he got within earshot.” Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5. While a fair 
critique of disclosure in general, this is not an indictment of the proposed salience shock because we believe that, 
when made aware of the costs of overdrafting, consumers will overwhelmingly choose not to complete a transaction 
likely to incur a large fee. This is consistent with survey evidence suggesting that nearly all consumers do not realize 
they have overdrafted. In this setting, it’s more like Odysseus being tied to the mast when a simple alert from his 
fellow sailors— there are sirens coming and if they lure you off this boat it won’t end well—would have sufficed. 
239 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 236, at 744. 
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overdraft charges by 24%.240 As a result, all UK banking customers now receive these 
notifications.241  
The ability of increased salience to shape consumer choice is also evident in the payday 
lending space. When consumers considering a payday loan learn how its financing charge 
compares with the cost of borrowing a similar sum on a credit card, the take-up of payday loans 
falls significantly.242 The same is true in the credit card market, where the CARD Act’s 
requirement that issuers disclose the benefits of early repayment increases consumers’ pre-
payment significantly243 and the retail investing market, where consumers made aware of high 
mutual fund fees re-allocate investments.244   
Salience shocks can thus be extended to consumer finance products more generally. For 
example, for credit card, mortgage, or student loan late fees, a notification reminding a consumer 
to pay her bill immediately or incur a penalty would be more effective in discouraging delinquency 
than ex-ante disclosure of high penalty fees in these contracts. Given consumers’ limited attention, 
interventions that make prices salient just prior to decisions that will precipitate penalties will limit 
costly consumer mistakes.  
It is important to restrict these sorts of salience interventions and dynamically assess when they 
are most necessary and most likely to be effective. “Shocking” consumers along all the decisions 
they make—and all the fees they are assessed—is likely to run into Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s 
“accumulation” problem: “So many disclosures assail disclosees that they cannot possibly attend 
to more than a fraction of them.”245 As such, it will be important to focus on salience shocks to 
target only lines of revenue generation that are (1) generating significant profits for large financial 
institutions and (2) seem poorly understood by the consumers bearing them.246  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240 New Overdraft Alerts as CMA Banking Rules Come into Force. GOV.UK (Feb. 2, 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-overdraft-alerts-as-cma-banking-rules-come-into-force (last visited on 
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overdraft/ (last visited on Jun. 27, 2018). 
242 See Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. 
FIN. 1865 (2011). 
243 See Agarwal et al., supra note 69 (finding making salient the benefits of early repayment on monthly statements 
increases the number of account holders that repay early).  
244 Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual 
Fund Choice, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 605 (2014). 
245 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, supra note 243.  
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salience problems. Further work should consider the appropriate regulatory design, but as a starting point, I suggest a 
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Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY (Fall 2017), in the macroprudential risk arena. These authors 
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IV.  CAVEATS 
 
The salience theory presented herein can neither explain all aspects of bank responses to 
the regulations discussed nor elucidate for regulators the optimal intervention in all consumer 
finance settings. For example, at least part of the success of the overdraft default change stems 
from large financial institutions moving even beyond the new requirements. It is perhaps possible 
to fit this large-versus-small bank heterogeneity into the context of the salience theory, if there is 
reason to believe overdraft costs became more salient to large-bank customers than to their small-
bank counterparts. This seems unlikely. Anecdotally, larger financial institutions suggest that their 
decision to move away from overdraft as a product is related to reputational consequences and 
fears of costly litigation.247 These concerns are less pronounced for small banks. Consequently, 
the fact that small and midsize banks failed to move away from overdraft is not a by-product of 
differential salience of these fees to their consumers, but instead a consequence of these differences 
in reputational risk as well as heterogeneity in bank business models: Small and midsize banks 
depend on fee income more than large national banks, whose market shares are rising 
substantially.248  
Also, I have not considered the full set of possible behaviorally informed interventions in 
these markets. For example, Professors Michael Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir 
suggest an alternative: Banks have high add-on prices because they increase profits. Forcing 
issuers to place a portion of consumer penalty fees into a public trust for financial education 
decouples fee revenue from firms’ bottom lines so the incentive for shrouding would be 
removed.249 This suggestion tackles salience problems in a manner similar to price regulation—
directly limiting banks’ ability to profit from hidden fees.  
This Article advocates for regulation in response to price-shrouding, but engages less with 
how to design these interventions. One alternative is new legislation, like the CARD Act or Durbin. 
Another is Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides the CFPB with rule-making 
authority to intervene to prohibit “abusive” bank practices that take “unreasonable advantage” of 
the “lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of 
the product or service.”250 The nature of price-shrouding fits clearly into this abusive standard—
financial institutions use loss-leader pricing (0% APR, free checking) to attract customers who 
lack understanding of the true costs of these products. Although there are limits to this authority,251 
it seems natural for salience-focused interventions to be promulgated as CFPB rule-makings.252  
Additionally, this Article focuses on understanding the differential response to Durbin and 
the CARD Act but only tangentially engages with an important distinction between these two case 
studies: The CARD Act relates to a direct transaction between a sophisticated bank and a naïve 
                                                 
247 See infra note 125.  
248 See, e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign, Biggest Three Banks Gobble Up $2.4 Trillion in New Deposits Since Crisis, 
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250 12 U.S.C. § 5531. 
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consumer, whereas Durbin regulated a firm-to-firm transaction between retailers and merchants 
(with consumers indirectly involved as the purchasers of retail goods and the holders of bank 
checking accounts). There are reasons to believe regulatory interventions are differentially 
necessary and will have heterogeneous impact in these two settings.  Professors Oren Bar-Gill and 
Omri Ben-Shahar focus on this distinction in their work on default rules in consumer markets, 
noting that the general theory—that default rules mimic what most parties would agree to—
becomes less plausible in consumer markets.253 It is likely that, given the asymmetry of 
information and bargaining power in the consumer/firm relationship, the need for intervention is 
most clear. This is another way to distinguish the success of the CARD Act relative to Durbin’s 
interchange price cap. Though, it is important to note that small merchants have little bargaining 
power with Visa and Mastercard, much like retail consumers in their banking relationships.254   
Also, there is an important difference between behavioral agents who fail to consider non-
salient prices in their product decisions (for example, bank customers who do not realize overdraft 
is costly) and behavioral agents who, even when provided full information, make a seemingly 
irrational choice.255 This Article is concerned principally with agents who neglect certain aspects 
of a price, primarily for behavioral reasons like inattention or over-optimism. This Article is not 
concerned with agents who, when faced with the true price, will still make irrational decisions. 
Such a case would prove more complicated for a regulator and is one where “salience shock” type 
interventions are unlikely to be effective. 
Furthermore, there is robust discussion among academics interested in financial regulation 
around the merits of traditional cost-benefit analysis.256 While this Article does not take a stand on 
this debate, it is worth noting that both formal cost-benefit analysis and the more informal 
approaches advocated by its critics would do well to consider possible unintended consequences 
of regulatory interventions—for example, the push toward credit usage resulting from Durbin’s 
debit fee cap.   
Finally, this Article suggests that well-designed regulatory intervention can decrease 
overall consumer costs in imperfectly competitive markets with shrouded prices. However, it does 
not deal with the appropriate design or magnitude of price caps. Although beyond the scope of this 
Article, this hinges on market particulars: The larger the consumer misperception, the more likely 
price will deviate from cost, and thus the more aggressive the intervention should be.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Consumer financial protection is an area of critical importance to the regulatory 
community. This Article focuses on three recent regulatory interventions that sought to lower 
consumer costs: (1) a cap on debit interchange fees; (2) a restriction on credit card contract terms, 
including interchange hikes and penalty fee amounts; and (3) a change in the overdraft default rule 
that prohibits banks from charging penalty fees unless consumers have actively opted in to 
overdraft protection.  
I argue that, given the success of the CARD Act and the new overdraft regime, the existence 
of non-salient consumer prices suggests a behavioral market failure that regulators can correct. 
Consumers misperceive the true cost of consumer financial products, either because they are 
inattentive to confusing and lengthy contract terms or overly optimistic and underestimate their 
likelihood of bearing penalty fees. Regulatory intervention that caps non-salient fees or makes 
these fees salient can curtail excessive product use; decrease subsidies by the unsophisticated of 
sophisticated market participants; limit inefficient consumer behavior; and, in an imperfectly 
competitive world, lower overall consumer costs. This is not to say that price regulations that 
restrict salient fees—for example, the Durbin Amendment—are inadvisable, but these are likely 
to prompt substantial bank offset.   
 
